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Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations

Budget performance for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017, financing for the period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018 and proposed budget for the period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019 of the support account for peacekeeping operations

Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

Appropriation for 2016/17	$327,380,300
Expenditure for 2016/17	$327,055,900
Unencumbered balance for 2016/17	$324,400
Appropriation for 2017/18	$325,800,000
Projected expenditure for 2017/18[a]	$325,741,500
Projected underexpenditure for 2017/18[a]	$58,500
Proposal submitted by the Secretary-General for 2018/19	$354,600,900
Adjustment recommended by the Advisory Committee for 2018/19	($26,397,400)
Recommendation of the Advisory Committee for 2018/19	$328,203,500

[a] Estimates as at 28 February 2018 (see sect. III below)

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Abbreviations

GS (OL)	General Service (Other level)
ICT	Information and communications technology
MINUJUSTH	United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NGS	National General Service
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
UNAMID	African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNISFA	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan

I. Introduction

1. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has considered an advance version of the report of the Secretary-General on the proposed budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019 (A/72/790) and related reports, including the report of the Independent Audit Advisory Committee on the proposed budget of the Office of Internal Oversight Services under the support account for 2018/19 (A/72/766). The documents reviewed and those used for background by the Advisory Committee are listed at the end of the present report. During its consideration of the reports, the Committee met with representatives of the Secretary-General, who provided additional information and clarification, concluding with written responses dated 23 April 2018.

2. The Advisory Committee's detailed comments and recommendations on the findings of the Board of Auditors on the United Nations peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017 and on cross-cutting issues related to peacekeeping operations can be found in its report on cross-cutting issues (A/72/789). In the present report, the Committee deals with resources and other items that relate specifically to the support account for peacekeeping operations.

II. Budget performance report for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017

3. The Secretary-General provides information on the budget performance of the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017 in his report on that subject (A/72/701). A summary of key initiatives undertaken by the departments and offices concerned is provided in paragraphs 4 to 31 of the report, and a list of core training activities is contained in its section IV. Information on planned and actual outputs relating to resource performance by all of the departments and offices funded from the support account is contained in the addendum to the report (A/72/701/Add.1).

4. In paragraph 3 of his report on the budget performance of the support account for 2016/17, the Secretary-General indicates that a number of Security Council decisions had a significant impact on the mandates of peacekeeping operations, with the departments and offices at United Nations Headquarters in New York providing backstopping support to implement the changes, as well as support to other ongoing peacekeeping operations in the field. In particular: (a) in the Central African Republic, the Security Council focused on a single strategic objective in the mandate of MINUSCA, namely, supporting the creation of conditions conducive to the sustainable reduction of the presence of, and threat posed by, armed groups (Council resolution 2301 (2016)); (b) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council mandated MONUSCO to provide technical assistance and logistical support for the revision of the electoral register (Council resolution 2277 (2016)); (c) in South Sudan, the Council increased the authorized strength of UNMISS uniformed personnel, including 4,000 military personnel for the Regional Protection Force in Juba, in response to the outbreak of violence in July 2016 (Council resolutions 2304 (2016), 2326 (2016) and 2327 (2016)); and (d) in Mali, the Council increased the authorized strength of uniformed personnel of MINUSMA by 2,049 military and 480 police personnel and the Mission implemented security enhancement projects and expanded existing camps to accommodate the additional troops (Council resolution 2295 (2016)).

5. The total amount of resources approved by the General Assembly for the support account for the financial period 2016/17 was $327,380,300 (gross), inclusive of the amounts of $16,830,400 for the Umoja enterprise resource planning project and $821,500 for information and systems security. According to the Secretary-General, actual expenditure for the period totalled $327,055,900, resulting in an unutilized balance of $324,400, or 0.1 per cent. The Secretary-General is requesting the Assembly to decide on the treatment of the unencumbered balance of $324,400 in respect of the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017, as well as on the treatment of other revenue amounting to $813,800, comprising investment revenue ($811,000) and other miscellaneous revenue ($2,800), in respect of the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017 (see sect. V below).

6. Tables 1 and 2 of the performance report present summaries of the resource performance for the period 2016/17 by category of expenditure and by department/office, respectively. The unencumbered balance of $324,400 reflects the combined effect of: (a) higher-than-budgeted expenditures under post resources ($790,700, or 0.4 per cent); and (b) lower-than-budgeted expenditures under non-post resources ($1,092,300, or 1.2 per cent). A detailed analysis of variances is provided in section III of the report. The comments of the Advisory Committee on the information presented in the report with respect to individual objects of expenditure can be found, where relevant, in the discussion of the proposed budget for the period 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019 in section IV below.

III. Information on performance for the current period

7. With respect to current and projected expenditures for the period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018, the Advisory Committee was informed that, as at 28 February 2018, expenditures were projected at $227,994,300. At the end of the current financial period, the estimated total expenditure would amount to $325,741,500, against the appropriation of $325,800,000, leaving a projected unencumbered balance of $58,500.

IV. Proposed budget for the period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019

A. General considerations

Support account resource requirements and the proposed reform initiatives

8. In his report on the proposed budget for the support account for the period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019 (A/72/790), the Secretary-General indicates that the proposed budget for 2018/19 amounts to $354,600,900 (gross), including a number of requirements for organizational initiatives (see para. 19 below), representing an increase of $28,800,900, or 8.8 per cent, compared with the appropriation for 2017/18. The Secretary-General also indicates that the proposed budget reflects the impact of his proposed reform initiatives on peace and security, management and global service delivery (see A/72/772, A/72/492/Add.2, A/72/801 and A/72/801/Add.1/Rev.1) and the movement of support account posts and non-post resources related to those initiatives. For the departments affected by the initiatives, namely, the Department of Management, the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support, the Secretary-General's support account proposal is presented in two six-month segments with two six-month proposals. The first six-month proposal, for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2018, reflects the offices currently included in the support account,

while the second six-month proposal, for the period from 1 January to 30 June 2019, reflects the revised structure of the Organization as proposed by the Secretary-General. For those departments/offices not directly affected by the restructuring under the Secretary-General's reform initiatives, namely, the United Nations Office to the African Union, OIOS, the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, offices under the administration of justice, the Ethics Office, the Office of Legal Affairs, the Department of Public Information, the Department of Safety and Security, the Advisory Committee and OHCHR, the proposed budget reflects a full 12 months based on the current organizational structure.

9. The Advisory Committee considers that the fundamental purpose of the support account is to provide backstopping capacity to peacekeeping missions in the context of the current configuration of existing departments and offices. The Committee notes that the support account budget proposal was presented in the context of management reform proposals that had not been considered by the General Assembly prior to the inclusion of their implications in the proposed support account resource requirements for the 2018/19 period.

10. **Given that the management reform proposals of the Secretary-General and their related implications for the support account require separate and distinct consideration, the Advisory Committee would have expected the Secretary-General to present the support account budget proposal on the basis of the current organizational structure. The Committee is, therefore, not in a position to make an assessment of the post- and non-post-related implications of the management reforms proposed in the support account at this time. Nevertheless, in the interim, the Committee recognizes the need for support account-funded posts and resources for the 2018/19 period and, therefore, recommends the approval of a support account budget based on the current organizational structure of the departments and offices funded under the support account. The Committee recommends the approval of post and non-post resource requirements for a full 12-month period based on the resource requirements of the first 6 months under the current organizational structure and in lieu of the resource requirements proposed for the second 6-month period reflecting the Secretary-General's reform initiatives, subject to its comments and recommendations in the paragraphs below.**

11. The Committee has therefore considered the first 6-month segment of the support account proposal annualized over a 12-month period in order to make an assessment of resource requirements applicable to the 12-month period, excluding the implications of the reforms, and has not considered the proposals contained in the second 6-month segment reflecting the possible impact of the proposed reform initiatives of the Secretary-General. The Committee considered the proposals of the Secretary-General relating to the establishment of posts in the Peacebuilding Support Office under the support account, in view of the General Assembly's directive on the peace and security pillar reforms in its resolution 72/199 (see sect. H below). With regard to the 12-month support account budget, the Committee was provided, upon request, with the information related to the current needs of the existing departments (excluding the reform-related implications) included in annex I to the present report.

Scalability considerations

12. Tables 1 and 2 of the report of the Secretary-General provide an overview of the financial and human resources for peacekeeping components for the periods 2013/14 to 2018/19. Table 1 indicates that, when provisions for the enterprise resource planning, information and systems security and global service delivery model are excluded, the proposed resource requirements for the support account for 2018/19 amounts to $296.7 million, reflecting a decrease of $2,329,900 compared with the

2017/18 figure of $299.7 million. According to table 2, when the 2017/18 period is compared with the 2018/19 period, there is a decrease in the number of authorized uniformed personnel supported in the field, from 136,080 to121,739, with the number of civilian personnel supported in the field also expected to decrease, from 18,259 to 15,375. The Advisory Committee notes that, despite the decrease in the number of authorized uniformed personnel and civilian staff in peacekeeping missions, the support account ratio vis-à-vis overall peacekeeping resources has steadily increased, from 4.01 in 2015/16 to 4.37 in 2018/19 (see also A/72/770, paras. 155–159).

13. In paragraph 6 of his report, the Secretary-General states that the decreases in the number of personnel are due mainly to the mandated withdrawal of UNMIL by 30 April 2018 pursuant to Security Council resolution 2333 (2016) and to the closure of MINUSTAH by 15 October 2017, offset in part by the establishment of MINUJUSTH pursuant to Council resolution 2350 (2017), the strengthening of MINUSCA pursuant to Council resolution 2387 (2017), and the full deployment of MINUSMA. The Secretary-General also states that while the number of peacekeeping operations is decreasing in the 2018/19 period, the underlying complexity of the work undertaken by peacekeeping operations has persisted. In addition, he states that, as the enabling pillar of peacekeeping operations, backstopping functions at Headquarters are undertaking analytical and strategic activities in support of the field (see A/72/790, para. 9).

14. The Advisory Committee recalls its observation that the increase in the proposed budget of the support account for 2016/17 was made at a time of continued reductions in the budgets of, as well as the authorized levels of both uniformed and civilian personnel in, peacekeeping operations, the United Nations Support Office in Somalia and the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda (see A/70/837, para. 11). The Committee also recalls its observations and recommendations regarding the proposed support account budget for the 2017/18 period in view of the withdrawal of uniformed and civilian components in the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire and UNMIL and the expectation that a reduced requirement for backstopping functions should have been reflected in the proposed support account budget (see A/71/883, para. 12).

Comprehensive review of the support account for peacekeeping operations

15. In its resolutions 69/308 and 70/287, the General Assembly emphasized that support functions should be scalable to the size, number and scope of peacekeeping operations. In resolution 69/308, the Assembly also reiterated its request that the Secretary-General review the level of the support account on a regular basis, taking into consideration the number, size and complexity of peacekeeping operations. In resolution 70/287, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to present, at the second part of its resumed seventy-second session, a "comprehensive review" of the support account to ensure that it broadly corresponded to the evolving mandate, number, size and complexity of peacekeeping missions and to the implementation of organizational transformation initiatives. The Advisory Committee notes that the comprehensive review of the support account (see A/72/814) was only recently finalized and that the review contains neither concrete proposals nor a scalability model.

16. **The Advisory Committee notes the absence of a scalability model in the recently finalized comprehensive review of the support account (see A/72/814). The Committee also notes that, despite the absence of a scalability model with baseline indicators pertaining to complexity, mandate, mission size and other related criteria used to guide support account resource requirements as mandated by the General Assembly, the support account proposal indicates continuing complexity in the work being undertaken by a decreasing number of**

peacekeeping operations and personnel and in the analytical and strategic activities of backstopping functions at Headquarters in support of the field.

17. **The Advisory Committee also notes the absence of detailed proposals and a conclusion in the comprehensive review of the support account. In this regard, the Committee notes that the comprehensive review merits separate consideration and will revert to it at a later stage, particularly in view of the Secretary-General's intention to submit a proposal to the Assembly relating to the support account for its consideration at the second part of its seventy-fourth session (see A/72/492/Add.2, para. 66).** Related comments and observations of the Committee are contained in its report on cross-cutting issues (A/72/789).

B. Overall resource requirements

18. The proposed budget for the support account for the 2018/19 period amounts to $354,600,900 (gross) (including requirements for enterprise resource planning, information and systems security, the global service delivery model project, Global Shared Service Centres, peacekeeping capability readiness and peacekeeping cross-cutting initiatives), representing an increase of $28,800,900, or 8.8 per cent, compared with the appropriation for 2017/18.

19. The total resource requirements proposed for 2018/19 comprise the following:

(a) Post and non-post resources in the amount of $296,741,800, representing a decrease of $2,329,900, or 0.8 per cent, compared with the post and non-post resources approved for 2017/18;

(b) Enterprise resource planning project requirements in the amount of $28,859,100, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 72/262, representing an increase of $3,820,800, or 15.3 per cent, compared with the provision for 2017/18 (see para. 27 below);

(c) Information and systems security requirements in the amount of $821,500, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 68/247 A, based on the estimates presented in the report of the Secretary-General on progress on the implementation of recommendations related to strengthening information and systems security across the Secretariat (A/68/552) (see para. 27 below);

(d) Global service delivery model project requirements in the amount of $1,302,800, based on the estimates presented in the previous report of the Secretary-General on the global service delivery model for the United Nations Secretariat (A/71/417) (see A/72/6 (Sect. 29A); see also para. 26 below);

(e) Global Shared Service Centres requirements in the amount of $9,905,900, to support the operationalization and start-up of the Service Centres; the amount represents the peacekeeping share of provisions for the Centres as set out in the most recent report of the Secretary-General on the global service delivery model for the United Nations Secretariat (A/72/801 and A/72/801/Add.1/Rev.1) (see para. 25 below);

(f) Peacekeeping capability readiness requirements in the amount of $3,881,600, for reimbursement to troop- and police-contributing countries that have held contingents at the rapid deployment level, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 71/296;

(g) Requirements for organizational initiatives related primarily to the deployment and post-deployment support of Umoja in the field, in the amount of $13.1 million (see A/70/749 and A/71/809; see also paras. 21–24 below).

20. The Secretary-General indicates that the provision for the support account base requirements, including post and non-post resources, is reduced by $2.4 million from the $299.1 million approved in the 2017/18 period to the proposed $296.7 million in the 2018/19 period. The Advisory Committee was provided with additional information relating to the 2018/19 period showing the proposed new posts and posts proposed for abolishment (see annex II to the present report); the proposed restructuring, redeployment, reassignment and reclassification of posts (see annex III); and the proposed general temporary assistance positions (see annex IV).

Corporate initiatives

21. The Secretary-General indicates that organizational initiatives related primarily to the support of Umoja in the field are estimated in the amount of $13.1 million (see para. 19 (g) above). He also indicates that the requirements relate primarily to support for the deployment and post-deployment support of Umoja in peacekeeping operations, including master data management, and include 49 general temporary assistance positions as well as contractual services and travel.

22. In paragraphs 1 to 7 of annex XIX to the budget report, the Secretary-General indicates that the General Assembly, in its resolution 69/274, requested the Secretary-General to establish clear procedures for the capture and central recording of indirect costs relating to the implementation of Umoja, and reiterated its request to absorb such costs within the approved budget of each department (see resolution 69/274, sect. VI, para. 16). In annex XIX, the resource requirements are shown separately from the other activities of the departments under the support account (see A/72/790, para. 24). For the 2015/16 period, the General Assembly adopted its resolution 69/307 on cross-cutting issues, in which it endorsed the recommendations of the Advisory Committee stressing the importance of establishing comprehensive and detailed estimates of direct and indirect costs, guided by clear cost-apportionment principles and accurate accounting and transparent reporting requirements (see A/69/839, paras. 112–114). As a result, 41 general temporary assistance positions were established and initially charged to the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, and to the support account for the 2015/16 period. The Secretary-General indicates that this resulted in a move away from the previous use of vacant mission posts.

23. This arrangement, whereby costs for the temporary positions were apportioned to peacekeeping missions at the end of the period on the basis of the services provided to each mission, was continued in the 2016/17 period with the continuation/establishment of 67 general temporary assistance positions under the United Nations Logistics Base and the support account, which were then apportioned to peacekeeping missions. The Secretary-General indicates that, in order to improve accuracy, transparency and the timely forecast of charges apportioned to peacekeeping missions, 48 positions were established under the cost-recovery mechanism for the 2017/18 period. He also indicates that the ability of peacekeeping missions to absorb these corporate costs through reprioritization of activities was affected in the 2017/18 period owing to budget reductions. As a result, the Secretary-General proposes the funding of these corporate projects under the support account for the 2018/19 period in order to enhance resource planning and predictability.

24. The Advisory Committee notes, from the information provided to it, that the arrangement to apportion costs for the temporary positions to peacekeeping missions at the end of the period on the basis of the services provided to each mission was reflected in previous reports of the Secretary-General on the overview of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations (A/70/749 and A/71/809). The current support account proposal also indicates that the number of projects and the level of resources requested for the 2018/19 period are in line with the level for 2017/18. **The**

Committee acknowledges the challenges faced by the Secretariat in apportioning costs to peacekeeping missions proportionately to the level of service provided by Headquarters and in securing funding for the continuation of organizational initiatives given the reductions in peacekeeping budgets. Nevertheless, the Committee is of the view that the costs are intrinsically of a temporary nature and that they have been absorbed by peacekeeping missions under an established arrangement. The Committee therefore recommends the approval of the continuing general temporary assistance positions under the original cost recovery mechanism and recommends against the approval of the proposed resources in the support account under organizational initiatives in the amount of $13,088,200. The Committee recommends against the approval of the four proposed positions of Finance and Budget Officer (2 P-3) and Administrative Officer and Data Analyst (2 P-3) in the Department of Field Support. Any related non-post resources should be adjusted accordingly.

25. The Secretary-General indicates that organizational initiatives related to the Global Shared Service Centres in the amount of $9,905,900 is required for the peacekeeping share of provisions for the Centres as set out in his report on the global service delivery model for the United Nations Secretariat (A/72/801 and A/72/801/Add.1/Rev.1) (see para. 19 above). The observations and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on the proposed resource requirements for the global service delivery model will be contained in its forthcoming report on that subject. **In the absence of decisions by the General Assembly on the proposals of the Secretary-General related to the Global Shared Service Centres, the Committee recommends against the approval of the proposed resources in the amount of $9,905,900.**

Other organizational initiatives

26. The Secretary-General indicates that organizational initiatives related to the global service delivery model project team amount to $1,302,800 (see para. 19 above). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was provided with additional information relating to the requirements as based on the estimates presented in the previous report of the Secretary-General on the global service delivery model for the United Nations Secretariat (A/71/417) (see A/72/6 (Sect. 29A)) and the related General Assembly resolutions 72/263 A–C. The Committee was informed that, in the programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019 (see A/72/6 (Sect. 29A)), the share for the project team for the global service delivery model for the full biennium 2018–2019 related to the support account for peacekeeping operations amounted to $1,737,000. Taking into account that the previously approved provision covered the period up to 31 December 2017 (the biennium 2016–2017), the provision in the support account for the 2018/19 period covers the 18-month period from 1 January 2018 to 30 June 2019, and the provision is calculated as 1.5 years divided by 2 years times $1,737,000. **The Committee recommends the approval of the resource requirements for the global service delivery model project team in the amount of $1,302,800.**

27. Organizational initiatives to be funded from the support account in the 2018/19 period also relate to: enterprise resource planning project requirements in the amount of $28,859,100, as presented by the Secretary-General in his ninth progress report on that project (A/72/397) and as noted by the General Assembly in its resolution 72/262; information and systems security requirements in the amount of $821,500, based on the estimates presented in the report of the Secretary-General on strengthening information and systems security (A/68/552) and pursuant to Assembly resolution 68/247 A; and peacekeeping capability readiness requirements of $3,881,600 for reimbursement to troop- and police-contributing countries that have held contingents at the rapid deployment level, pursuant to Assembly resolution 71/296 (see para. 19

above). **The Advisory Committee recommends the approval of the resource requirements for the enterprise resource planning project in the amount of $28,859,100, for information and systems security in the amount of $821,500, and for peacekeeping capability readiness in the amount of $3,881,600.**

Non-post resources

28. The Secretary-General indicates that the total non-post requirements proposed for the support account for the 2018/19 period amount to $73,927,400, representing a decrease of $1,278,000, or 1.7 per cent, compared with the apportionment for 2017/18. The Advisory Committee recalls its comments and recommendations in paragraph 10 above and notes the absence of sufficient justification relating to the non-post resource requirements for the support account, including information on actual and past expenditures by division and categories of expenditure by division. **The Committee recommends a 5 per cent reduction to non-post resource requirements, excluding requirements for general temporary assistance as recommended separately below, for a full 12-month period based on the resource requirements of the first 6 months under the current organizational structure. The Committee, therefore, recommends a reduction in the amount of $2,906,400 under non-post resources for the 2018/19 period.**

General temporary assistance

29. As regards general temporary assistance, the Secretary-General indicates that the proposed resource requirements amount to $10,013,600, representing a decrease of $2,185,400, or 17.9 per cent, compared with the apportionment for 2017/18. In table 4 and paragraphs 30 and 31 of his report, the Secretary-General indicates the financial implications corresponding to each of the proposals for new posts and general temporary assistance positions.

Budget parameters

30. The budget parameters applied with respect to post and non-post resources for 2018/19 are explained by the Secretary-General in paragraphs 40 to 44 of his report. Standard salary costs, based on the salary scale and post adjustments multiplier published by the International Civil Service Commission effective as of 1 January 2018, have been applied to all positions at Headquarters, Addis Ababa and Vienna. With regard to positions located in peacekeeping missions and the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, relevant mission-specific salary costs determined by the Peacekeeping Financing Division have been applied. The updated common staff costs for staff funded from the support account for the 2018/19 period have been estimated at 54.1 per cent of net salaries, compared with 49.2 per cent of net salaries for 2017/18. The level is based on the actual expenditures incurred from 1 January to 31 December 2017.

31. **The Advisory Committee recommends the approval of the 2018/19 post and non-post resource requirements proposed for all departments and offices under the support account, for a 12-month period under the existing organizational structure of the departments and offices currently funded under the support account, and subject to its comments and recommendations contained in paragraphs 10, 24, 25 and 28 above and the paragraphs below.**

C. Department of Peacekeeping Operations

32. In the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the following are proposed: the establishment of one post (1 General Service (Other level)), the abolishment of nine

posts (2 P-5, 4 P-4 and 3 General Service (Other level)), the continuation of six general temporary assistance positions (5 P-4 and 1 General Service (Other level)) and the redeployment one post (1 P-4), as well as the continuation of three positions for leave replacements. **The Advisory Committee recommends the approval of the Secretary-General's staffing proposals for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, subject to its recommendation in paragraph 33 below.**

Establishment of one post of Administrative Assistant (General Service (Other level))

33. Under the Office of the Chief of Staff, Focal Point for Security, the Secretary-General proposes the establishment of one new post of Administrative Assistant (General Service (Other level)). The Secretary-General indicates that the incumbent of the proposed post would provide administrative and communication support to assist programme personnel and that the Senior Coordination Officer (P-5) is currently supported by two officers at the P-4 level and one Administrative Assistant (see A/72/790, paras. 55–57, 60 and 61). **Taking into account the existing capacity in the Office, the Advisory Committee recommends against the establishment of the new post of Administrative Assistant (General Service (Other level)). Any related non-post resources should be adjusted accordingly.**

D. Department of Management

34. In the Department of Management, the following are proposed: the establishment of 2 posts (1 P-3 and 1 P-4), the establishment of 1 ten-month position (P-4), the conversion of 2 general temporary assistance positions of Finance and Budget Officer (P-3) to posts and the continuation of 10 general temporary assistance positions (4 P-4, 4 P-3 and 2 General Service (Other level)), as well as the continuation of 2 positions for leave replacements. **The Advisory Committee recommends the approval of the Secretary-General's staffing proposals for the Department of Management, subject to its recommendations in the paragraphs below.**

1. Office of the Under-Secretary-General

Establishment of one post of Legal Officer (P-3)

35. The Secretary-General proposes the establishment of one post of Legal Officer (P-3) in the Management Evaluation Unit. He indicates that since July 2009 caseloads from field missions have made up 45 per cent of all requests, with an overall average of 622 requests per year received from field missions, compared with the total average of roughly 975 received by the Unit per year (ibid., para. 230 and table 9). The Secretary-General also indicates that the incumbent of the post of Legal Officer will enhance the Unit's capacity to indirectly reduce the number of cases appealed to the United Nations Dispute Tribunal by increasing its capacity to identify and propose measures to address common situations that give rise to management evaluation requests, as well as enhance managerial capacity by identifying and proposing measures to address recurrent problems in specific offices or departments (ibid., para. 234). The Committee was also provided, upon enquiry, with additional information relating to the cases received in the 2017/18 period. **Taking into consideration the statistics indicated above and the previous observations of the Committee regarding the importance of the informal resolution system (see A/71/436 and A/72/7/Add.19), the Committee is of the view that the workload of the Legal Officer (P-3) is still to be determined on the basis of developments with respect to the number of disciplinary matters. The Committee therefore**

recommends the approval of the establishment of the Legal Officer (P-3) in the Management Evaluation Unit as a general temporary assistance position.

2. Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts

36. In terms of the role and functions of the Peacekeeping Financing Division of the Office of Programme Planning, Budgets and Accounts, the Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that during the current budget period, the Division had assumed an expanded role in the budgetary process by receiving the budget submissions directly from the missions and was responsible for managing additional reviews, particularly with regard to refining estimates in line with mission operational requirements, and coordinating with a number of counterparts at United Nations Headquarters, as the budget documents were prepared and finalized. The Division also ensured that the proposals were in conformity with the strategic guidance of the Under-Secretaries-General for Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support on resource requirements and results-based-budgeting frameworks. The Committee was also informed of the continuous nature of the communication and coordination between the Division and the missions, through mission visits and videoconferences to provide technical advice and guidance on results-based budgeting, staffing and financial resource requirements and to support missions in budget formulation, and that the related additional workload had been absorbed within the existing approved resources (see also para. 38 below).

37. The Advisory Committee notes that, under the support account, the Field Budget and Finance Division of the Department of Field Support has a total staffing capacity of 75 posts approved in the 2017/18 period and 73 posts and positions proposed for the 2018/19 period (see A/72/790, table in sect. III.C (a)). The Committee also notes from information provided to it that 44 posts are currently proposed in the Budget and Performance Reporting Service and the remaining posts are proposed in the Reimbursement Policy and Liaison Section and the Memorandum of Understanding and Claims Management Section.

38. **Taking into consideration existing capacity and the expanded responsibilities of the Peacekeeping Financing Division, the Advisory Committee is of the view that an assessment of the functions and responsibilities of the Field Budget and Finance Division and the Peacekeeping Financing Division would be necessary prior to the submission of the next support account budget proposal should the current distribution of functions and responsibilities continue. The Committee considers that the assessment should take into account such factors as workload and functional capacity.**

Conversion of two general temporary assistance positions of Finance and Budget Officer (P-3) to posts

39. The Secretary-General proposes the conversion of two general temporary assistance positions of Finance and Budget Officer (P-3) to posts in the Peacekeeping Financing Division for continuing financial and legislative backstopping of UNISFA, given that requirements for the financing of support for UNISFA have grown significantly in recent years and to strengthen the Division's capacity to provide policy guidance and coordination strategy on cross-cutting matters, including the deployment of Umoja Extension 2 modules for supply chain management and budget formulation and resource requirements for service providers (ibid., paras. 248–249). **The Advisory Committee acknowledges the continuous nature of the functions in the Peacekeeping Financing Division (see the Committee's observations in paras. 36–38 above) and recommends the approval of the conversion of two positions of Finance and Budget Officer (P-3) to posts in the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts.**

3. Office of Human Resources Management

Establishment of one post of Human Resources Officer (P-4)

40. The Secretary-General proposes the establishment of one post of Human Resources Officer (P-4) in the Strategic Planning and Staffing Division in relation to the Secretary-General's System-wide Strategy on Gender Parity to coordinate gender-related efforts among various stakeholders (ibid., paras. 260–261). The Secretary-General indicates that the post requires specialized expertise in gender and related affairs, with an understanding of field operations, as well as the ability to provide strategic guidance and recommendations that take account of the unique setting of peacekeeping operations. The Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that the System-wide Strategy on Gender Parity was a priority for the Secretary-General and was intended to ensure that the Organization achieved gender parity. **The Committee is of the view that the issue of gender parity in the peacekeeping context is of a strategic and wide-reaching nature and should permeate the work of the Office of Human Resources Management rather than reside in one function. The Committee therefore considers that any support required may be met through existing capacity and recommends against the establishment of the post of Human Resources Officer (P-4) in the Strategic Planning and Staffing Division. Any related non-post resources should be adjusted accordingly.**

Continuation of one general temporary assistance position of Human Resources Officer (mobility) (P-3)

41. The Secretary-General proposes the continuation of one general temporary assistance position of Human Resources Officer (mobility) (P-3) to support the review and the development and implementation of a new approach to mobility (ibid., para. 263). He indicates that, following the launch of the Political, Peace and Humanitarian Network (POLNET) in 2016 and the Information and Telecommunication Technology Network (ITECNET) in 2017, the Office of Human Resources Management is undertaking a comprehensive review of the framework and is designing and implementing improvements to staff selection and the Organization's approach to mobility. The Advisory Committee recalls that, in the context of the management reforms, the Secretary-General has decided to pause the implementation of the mobility framework, with no new vacancy or managed mobility exercises planned to be launched in 2018. **Considering that the mobility exercise has been paused, the Committee considers that any support required to conduct the review of the mobility framework may be met through the existing capacity of the Office of Human Resources Management. The Committee recommends against the continuation of the general temporary assistance position of Human Resources Officer (mobility) (P-3). Any related non-post resources should be adjusted accordingly.**

4. Office of Central Support Services

Establishment of one general temporary assistance position of Information Management Officer (P-4)

42. The Secretary-General proposes the establishment of one general temporary assistance position of Information Management Officer (P-4) for 10 person-months in the Archives and Records Management Section to develop a technology plan and business case to preserve peacekeeping archives (ibid., paras. 305–306). The Advisory Committee was provided, upon request, with additional details relating to the position and the nature of the digitally endangered data sets. **The Committee was not convinced that 10 person-months is necessary to carry out the analysis and strategy formulation required to preserve the data and recommends the approval**

of th proposed general temporary assistance position for 5 person-months. Any related non-post resources should be adjusted accordingly.

E. Office of Internal Oversight Services

43. In the Office of Internal Oversight Services, the following are proposed: the abolishment of 1 post (1 national General Service), the establishment of 1 post of Administrative Assistant (General Service (Other level)), the conversion of 18 positions to posts (1 P-5, 3 P-4, 11 P-3 and 3 national General Service), the establishment of 6 general temporary assistance positions (2 P-4 and 4 P-3) and the continuation of 22 general temporary assistance positions and 2 positions for leave replacements. The Secretary-General also proposes the conversion of 1 general temporary assistance position to a post (1 P-3) and its redeployment from MINUSMA to MONUSCO; the redeployment of 2 posts (2 P-4) from MINUJUSTH to MINUSCA and to New York; the redeployment of 1 post (1 P-4) from UNAMID to UNMISS; the reassignment of 2 posts of UNAMID and UNMIL Resident Auditor (2 P-3), as posts of Investigator (2 P-3) in New York; and the reassignment of 1 post of UNMIL Resident Auditor (1 P-4) as a post of Investigator (P-3) in New York. **The Advisory Committee recommends the approval of the Secretary-General's staffing proposals for the Office of Internal Oversight Services, subject to its recommendations in the paragraphs below. The Committee reiterates that a vacancy factor of 50 per cent should be applied to posts proposed for reassignment (see A/71/883, para. 98).**

1. Internal Audit Division

Redeployment of one post of Resident Auditor (P-4) from the MINUJUSTH Resident Audit Office to the ICT Audit Section in New York

44. The Secretary-General proposes the redeployment of one post of Resident Auditor (P-4) from the MINUJUSTH Resident Audit Office to the ICT Audit Section in New York. The Secretary-General states that the proposed redeployment will strengthen the Section's capacity to respond to the high-risk/priority issues facing the Organization by undertaking a number of functions, including assessments of the resilience of the Organization's ICT infrastructure in responding to cyber/ICT security threats, reviewing critical enterprise applications/systems and providing audit-specific business intelligence reports for auditing in the Umoja environment (see A/72/790, para. 540). The Advisory Committee notes that, as MINUJUSTH has a more streamlined mandate than its predecessor, MINUSTAH, the scalability nature of this backstopping post would lead to the expectation of a proposal to abolish the post. Furthermore, the Committee notes that the Division is proposing requirements for consultants in the ICT audit security and governance area while also proposing the redeployment of the Resident Auditor post to the ICT Audit Section in New York.

45. **The Advisory Committee reiterates its view that decreased requirements should result from the closure or streamlined mandates of missions (see A/71/883, paras. 98 and 100). Given the reduction in the number of planned audits in MINUJUSTH and available capacity in the Division, the Committee is of the view that the retention of the post through redeployment is not justified and that additional ICT capacity may be provided from existing resources. The Committee therefore recommends the abolishment of the post of Resident Auditor (P-4) in the MINUJUSTH Resident Audit Office. Any related non-post resources should be adjusted accordingly.**

Reassignment of two posts of Resident Auditor (1 P-3 and 1 P-4) from the UNMIL Resident Audit Office to the Investigations Division in New York as posts of Investigator (2 P-3)

46. In paragraphs 542 to 544 of his report, the Secretary-General sets out the proposals regarding the reassignment of one P-3 post and one P-4 post from the UNMIL Resident Audit Office to the Investigations Division in New York, where, the Secretary-General indicates, the Division has experienced an increasing number of investigation cases. The Advisory Committee was also provided, upon request, with the staffing information relating to the divisions of OIOS, including vacancy rates and the incumbency status of the posts and positions under recruitment. The Committee notes that, as UNMIL is ceasing its activities, the scalability nature of these backstopping posts would lead to the expectation of a proposal to abolish the posts.

47. **The Advisory Committee reiterates its view that decreased requirements should result from the closure or streamlined mandates of missions (see A/71/883, paras. 98 and 100). Given the closure of UNMIL and the available capacity in the Division, the Committee is of the view that the retention of the post through reassignment is not justified. The Committee therefore recommends the abolishment of the posts of Resident Auditor (1 P-3 and 1 P-4) formerly in the UNMIL Resident Audit Office. Any related non-post resources should be adjusted accordingly.**

2. **Investigations Division**

Conversion of 18 positions (1 P-5, 3 P-4, 11 P-3 and 3 national General Service) to posts in the Investigations Division; redeployment of 1 position (1 P-3) from MINUSMA to MONUSCO

48. The Secretary-General proposes the conversion of 18 general temporary assistance positions to posts (1 P-5, 3 P-4, 11 P-3 and 3 national General Service) in the Investigations Division and the redeployment of 1 of the 18 positions (1 P-3) from MINUSMA to MONUSCO. He indicates that the aim of the conversion of Resident Investigator positions is based on two main considerations, namely, to provide UNMISS, MINUSCA, MONUSCO and MINUSMA with a common staffing structure (1 P-5, 1 P-4, 2 P-3 and 1 national General Service) and to address high vacancy rates in field locations by creating a career path for Resident Investigators that mirrors that of Resident Auditors and Conduct and Discipline Unit staff. The Secretary-General also indicates that the functions undertaken are of a continuing nature and have been continued at the current level since the 2013/14 period (see A/72/790, paras. 549–551). The Advisory Committee was provided, upon request, with additional information regarding the proposed conversion and notes that although the general temporary assistance posts have been proposed in prior periods for conversion, the General Assembly, in its resolution 67/287, decided to convert 19 of the 51 positions proposed. **The Committee is not convinced that the continuous nature of the positions is a sufficiently rigorous justification in the absence of scalability considerations, and recommends against the proposed conversion of the 18 positions to posts. The Committee recommends the approval of the redeployment of the one position (1 P-3) from MINUSMA to MONUSCO.**

Sexual harassment investigations: establishment of 6 general temporary assistance positions (1 Investigator (P-4) and 2 Investigator (P-3) in New York and 1 Investigator (P-4) and 2 Investigator (P-3) in Nairobi)

49. The Secretary-General proposes the establishment of six general temporary assistance positions, namely, one position of Investigator (P-4) and two positions of

Investigator (P-3) in New York and one position of Investigator (P-4) and two positions of Investigator (P-3) in Nairobi, to provide investigation capacity for sexual harassment cases. He indicates that sexual harassment has now emerged as an organizational priority and been recognized as a risk and serious threat to the health, happiness, well-being and functional effectiveness of United Nations staff members who fall victim to sexual harassment, and as a major threat to the reputation of the Organization. The Secretary-General also describes the current caseload of investigators, the existing investigation capacity of the Division and the actions taken by the Division to manage the intake of sexual harassment cases and set up investigation processes and procedures (ibid., paras. 564–575). The Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that in the first quarter of 2018, and particularly following the Secretary-General's announcement of the prevention of sexual harassment as an Organizational priority, OIOS had received 21 reports, of which 19 constituted sexual harassment cases for investigation, representing a possible increase in the rate of growth of such cases from 3 per cent to 25 per cent.

50. **The Advisory Committee is of the view that the resources required for carrying out investigations into sexual harassment cases necessitate further clarification. The Committee stresses the need for greater clarity regarding the overall current and long-term needs, given the recent surge in awareness regarding the issue, and the capacities available for sexual harassment cases from different Organizational stakeholders and sources of funding. The Committee recalls that sexual harassment is prohibited conduct and is regulated by the Secretary-General's bulletin on the prohibition of discrimination, harassment, including sexual harassment, and abuse of authority (ST/SGB/2008/5), which provides a number of avenues for informal resolution as well as formal resolution. Therefore, the Committee is of the view that greater clarity is needed regarding Organizational initiatives to tackle the issue of sexual harassment, given pre-existing mechanisms and procedures. Taking these factors into consideration, the Committee recommends against the proposed establishment of one P-3 position in New York and one P-3 position in Nairobi. Any related non-post resources should be adjusted accordingly. The Committee recommends the approval of the remaining P-3 and P-4 positions in New York and Nairobi.**

F. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

51. In the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Secretary-General proposes the establishment of two posts (2 P-4) and the continuation of two general temporary assistance positions (1 P-4 and 1 P-3). **The Advisory Committee recommends the approval of the Secretary-General's staffing proposals for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, subject to its recommendations in the paragraphs below.**

Establishment of one post of Human Rights Officer (P-4) in the Peace Missions Support Section Office (New York)

52. The Secretary-General proposes the establishment of one post of Human Rights Officer (P-4) in the Peace Missions Support Section Office in New York to support the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support on the human rights aspects of regional peacekeeping partnerships. Specifically, the incumbent will provide advice, support and guidance to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and other relevant United Nations departments, including supporting the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support in developing and setting up a human

rights framework and designing and establishing mechanisms and developing standard operating procedures for compliance with the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support for non-United Nations forces and supporting the design and implementation of mitigatory measures. The Secretary-General provides further information on these functions, including coordinating United Nations and OHCHR support for the development of a human rights compliance framework for the support provided by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support for Security Council-mandated regional peacekeeping, and providing strategic advice and support to management (A/72/790, paras. 713–714). **Considering the direct support provided by the post to peacekeeping operations in terms of a human rights framework and mechanisms, the Advisory Committee recommends the approval of the establishment of one post of Human Rights Officer (P-4) in the Peace Missions Support Section Office in New York.**

Establishment of one post of Human Rights Officer (P-4) in the Methodology, Education and Training Section (Geneva)

53. The Secretary-General proposes the establishment of one post of Human Rights Officer (P-4) in the Methodology, Education and Training Section in Geneva to develop and deliver training and provide expert advice on methodology and practices related to gathering, analysing and reporting on human rights information and violations. The functions of the Human Rights Officer would include supporting human rights components in producing public reports and in facilitating the gathering and sharing of lessons learned and best practices across the human rights components of peacekeeping operations. The Advisory Committee was provided, upon request, with information relating to functions of the proposed post of Human Rights Officer in responding to the guidance and learning needs of human rights staff in peacekeeping operations as well as the continuous training and learning needs of human rights staff. **The Advisory Committee is not convinced by the justifications regarding the training and advisory functions, particularly given the competency, knowledge and expertise required of staff recruited to work on human rights issues in peacekeeping operations. The Committee therefore recommends against the establishment of one post of Human Rights Officer (P-4) in the Methodology, Education and Training Section in Geneva. Any related non-post resources should be adjusted accordingly.**

G. Peacebuilding Support Office

54. In the Peacebuilding Support Office, it is proposed that three posts be redeployed from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to the Peacebuilding Support Office in the context of the restructuring of the peace and security pillar (see A/72/772), as follows: one post of Political Affairs Officer (P-4) in the Peacebuilding Commission Support Branch; one post of Associate Political Affairs Officer (P-2) in the Office of the Assistant Secretary-General; and one post of Coordination Officer (P-4) in the Policy, Planning and Application Branch. **The related comments and observations of the Advisory Committee are contained in its report on the comprehensive report of the Secretary-General on the peace and security reform (see A/72/859, para. 32).**

V. Conclusion and recommendations

55. **With respect to resource requirements under the support account, the Advisory Committee recommends the approval of a support account budget based on the current organizational structure of the departments and offices**

funded under the support account. The Committee recommends the approval of post and non-post resource requirements for a full 12-month period based on the resource requirements of the first 6 months under the current organizational structure, subject to its comments and recommendations in the paragraphs below, and in lieu of the resource requirements proposed for the second 6-month period reflecting the Secretary-General's reform initiatives (see paras. 8 and 31 above). With regard to corporate initiatives under the support account, the Committee recommends a reduction of $9,905,900 related to the Global Shared Service Centres requirements and a reduction of $13,088,200 related to the deployment and post-deployment support of Umoja in the field.

56. **With respect to post requirements under the support account, as referred to in paragraph 55 above, the Advisory Committee recommends:**

(a) Against the establishment of the three proposed new posts, as follows:

(i) In the Department of Peacekeeping Operations: one post of Administrative Assistant (General Service (Other level)) (see para. 33 above);

(ii) In the Department of Management: one post of Human Resources Officer (P-4) (see para. 40 above);

(iii) In the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: one post of Human Rights Officer (P-4) (see para. 53 above);

(b) Approval of the proposed conversions from positions to posts and against the remaining 18 proposed conversions, as follows:

(i) In the Department of Management: approval of two conversions of general temporary assistance positions of Finance and Budget Officer (P-3) (see para. 39 above);

(ii) In the Office of Internal Oversight Services: against the conversion of 18 general temporary assistance positions to posts in the Investigations Division (1 P-5, 3 P-4, 11 P-3 and 3 national General Service) (see para. 48 above);

(c) Approval of one general temporary assistance position in lieu of the proposed post establishment, as follows: one position of Legal Officer (P-3) in the Department of Management (see para. 35 above);

(d) Approval of two posts, as follows:

(i) In the Office of Internal Oversight Services: one post of Administrative Assistant (General Service (Other level));

(ii) In the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: one post of Human Rights Officer (P-4) (see para. 52 above);

(e) Approval of four proposed redeployments/reassignments of posts, as follows:

(i) In the Department of Peacekeeping Operations: redeployment of one post of Occupational Safety Officer (P-4);

(ii) In the Office of Internal Oversight Services: redeployment of one post of Investigator (P-4) from MINUJUSTH to MINUSCA, redeployment of one post of Resident Auditor (P-4) from UNAMID to UNMISS, and reassignment of one post of Resident Auditor (P-3) from UNAMID as a post of Investigator (P-3) in New York;

(f) **Abolishment of the following three posts in the Office of Internal Oversight Services: three posts of Resident Auditor (2 P-4 and 1 P-3) (see paras. 45 and 47 above) in lieu of their redeployment/reassignment;**

(g) **Abolishment of the following three posts in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on 1 January 2019: Political Affairs Officer, Coordination Officer and Associate Political Affairs Officer (2 P-4 and 1 P-2), in lieu of their redeployment from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to the Peacebuilding Support Office (see para. 54 above).**

57. **With respect to non-post requirements related to general temporary assistance, the Advisory Committee recommends:**

(a) **Against the establishment of six proposed new positions, as follows:**

(i) **In the Office of Internal Oversight Services: two positions of Investigator (P-3) in New York and Nairobi (see para. 50 above);**

(ii) **In the Department of Field Support: two positions of Finance and Budget Officer (P-3) and two positions of Administrative Officer and Data Analyst (P-3) (see para. 24 above);**

(b) **Approval of the establishment of four proposed positions, as follows:**

(i) **In the Office of Internal Oversight Services: four positions of Investigator, in New York (1 P-4 and 1 P-3) and Nairobi (1 P-4 and 1 P-3) (see para. 50 above);**

(ii) **In the Department of Management: approval of one 5-person- month position of Information Management Officer (P-4) (see para. 42 above); and**

(c) **Approval of the proposed continuation of 62 of the 63 positions and against the approval of the following 1 proposed continuation in the Department of Management: one position of Human Resources Officer (P-3) (see para. 41 above).**

58. **With respect to other non-post requirements under the support account, as referred to in paragraph 55 above, the Advisory Committee recommends:**

(a) **Reduction of 5 per cent to non-post resources ($2,906,400);**

(b) **Adjustment of the non-post resources related to the posts and positions not recommended for establishment or recommended for abolishment in the present report ($276,800).**

59. **The above recommendations of the Advisory Committee would represent a decrease of $26,397,400 to the proposed budget of the Secretary-General. Accordingly, the proposed budget for the support account for 2018/19 would be decreased from $354,600,900 to $328,203,500. This amount includes $220,572,400 for post resources and $72,766,100 for non-post resources, $28,859,100 for the enterprise resource planning project requirements, $821,500 for information and systems security, $1,302,800 for the global service delivery model requirements and $3,881,600 for the peacekeeping capability readiness requirements.**

60. **The actions to be taken by the General Assembly in connection with the financing of the peacekeeping support account for the periods 2016/17 and 2018/19 are set out in the report on budget performance (see A/72/701, para. 42) and the report on the budget (see A/72/790, para. 764), respectively. The Advisory Committee recommends that the General Assembly:**

(a) **Approve the support account requirements in the amount of $328,203,500 for the 12-month period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019;**

(b) **Decide to apply the unencumbered balance of $324,400 in respect of the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017 to the support account requirements for the period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019;**

(c) **Decide to apply the total amount of other revenue amounting to $813,800, comprising investment revenue ($811,000) and other miscellaneous revenue ($2,800), in respect of the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017, to the support account requirements for the period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019;**

(d) **Decide to apply the excess of the authorized level of the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund in respect of the financial period ended 30 June 2017, in the amount of $928,800, to the support account requirements for the period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019.**

Documentation

- Report of the Secretary-General on the budget performance of the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017 (A/72/701 and A/72/701/Add.1)
- Report of the Secretary-General on the budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019 (A/72/790)
- Report of the Independent Audit Advisory Committee on the proposed budget of the Office of Internal Oversight Services under the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019 (A/72/766)
- Report of the Secretary-General on the overview of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations: budget performance for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017 and budget for the period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019 (A/72/770)
- Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions on the budget performance for the period from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016, financing for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017 and proposed budget for the period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018 of the support account for peacekeeping operations (A/71/883)
- General Assembly resolutions 69/308, 70/287 and 71/295

Annex I

Summary of the breakdown of resource requirements by department/office for the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	Expenditure (2016/17)	*Appropriation (2017/18)*	*Cost estimates July–December 2018*	*Cost estimates January–July 2019*	*Cost estimates July 2018–June 2019*	*Total cost estimates 2018/19*	*Variance*	
							Amount	*Percentage*
Department of Peacekeeping Operations	97 243.9	88 789.9	43 633.2	43 633.2	–	87 266.4	(1 523.5)	(1.7)
United Nations Office to the African Union	6 785.7	7 641.0	–	–	7 451.1	7 451.1	(189.9)	(2.5)
Department of Field Support	69 767.1	73 842.1	36 296.5	36 296.5	–	72 593.0	(1 249.1)	(1.7)
Department of Management	54 748.4	51 518.7	25 808.9	25 808.9	–	51 617.8	99.1	0.2
Office of Internal Oversight Services	29 390.4	28 010.7	–	–	29 731.4	29 731.4	1 720.7	6.1
Executive Office of the Secretary-General	1 117.6	1 028.8	–	–	1 008.9	1 008.9	(19.9)	(1.9)
Administration of justice	2 687.7	2 670.0	–	–	2 023.9	2 023.9	(646.1)	(24.2)
Office of Staff Legal Assistance	98.2	136.7	–	–	181.6	181.6	44.9	32.8
Office of the United Nations Ombudsman and Mediation Services	1 727.3	2 200.4	–	–	2 209.4	2 209.4	9.0	0.4
Ethics Office	1 094.9	1 059.6	–	–	1 151.7	1 151.7	92.1	8.7
Office of Legal Affairs	3 804.2	3 896.3	–	–	3 876.3	3 876.3	(20.0)	(0.5)
Department of Public Information	689.8	758.7	–	–	748.4	748.4	(10.3)	(1.4)
Department of Safety and Security	3 850.1	3 837.5	–	–	3 589.6	3 589.6	(247.9)	(6.5)
Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions	392.4	411.2	–	–	409.9	409.9	(1.3)	(0.3)
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights	1 947.5	1 991.9	–	–	2 329.3	2 329.3	337.4	16.9
Rent and facility costs for the Secretariat	24 107.3	20 932.2	10 562.3	10 562.3	–	21 124.6	192.4	0.9
After-service health insurance	9 974.3	10 346.0	5 499.4	5 499.4	–	10 998.8	652.8	6.3
Subtotal	**309 426.8**	**299 071.7**	**121 800.3**	**121 800.3**	**54 711.5**	**298 312.1**	**(759.6)**	**(0.3)**
Enterprise resource planning	16 830.4	25 038.3	28 859.1	–	–	28 859.1	3 820.8	15.3
Information and systems security	798.7	821.5	821.5	–	–	821.5	–	–
Global service delivery model	–	868.5	1 302.8	–	–	1 302.8	434.3	50.0
Global Shared Service Centres	–	–	9 905.9	–	–	9 905.9	9 905.9	–
Peacekeeping capability readiness	–	–	–	–	3 881.6	3 881.6	3 881.6	–
Peacekeeping cross-cutting initiatives	–	–	13 088.2	–	–	13 088.2	13 088.2	–
Gross requirements	**327 055.9**	**325 800.0**	**175 777.8**	**121 800.3**	**58 593.1**	**356 171.2**	**28 800.9**	**8.8**

Annex II

Proposed new posts and posts proposed for abolishment under the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019

Proposals of the Secretary-General (see A/72/790)

	Number of posts proposed	*Grade level*	*Functional title*	*Status*	*Number of years continued*
Department of Peacekeeping Operations					
Office of the Under-Secretary-General					
Front office of the Chief of Staff	1	GS (OL)	Administrative Assistant	New	–
Subtotal	**1**				
Office of Operations					
Africa II Division	(1)	P-5	Senior Political Affairs Officer	Abolishment	–
	(1)	P-4	Political Affairs Officer	Abolishment	–
Asia, Middle East, Europe and Latin America Division	(1)	GS (OL)	Team Assistant	Abolishment	–
Subtotal	**(3)**				
Office of Military Affairs					
Integrated Operational Team	(1)	P-5	Senior Military Liaison Officer	Abolishment	–
	(1)	P-4	Military Liaison Officer	Abolishment	–
Military Planning Section	(1)	P-4	Planning Officer	Abolishment	–
Force Generation Service	(1)	GS (OL)	Team Assistant	Abolishment	–
Subtotal	**(4)**				
Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions					
Police Division	(1)	P-4	Police Liaison Officer	Abolishment	–
Strategic Policy and Development Section	(1)	GS (OL)	Administrative Assistant	Abolishment	–
Subtotal	**(2)**				
Subtotal, Department of Peacekeeping Operations	**(8)**				
Department of Management					
Office of the Under-Secretary-General					
Management Evaluation Unit	1	P-3	Legal Officer	New	–
Subtotal	**1**				
Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts					
Peacekeeping Financing Division	2	P-3	Finance and Budget Officer	Conversion	> 5
Subtotal	**2**				

	Number of posts proposed	*Grade level*	*Functional title*	*Status*	*Number of years continued*
Office of Human Resources Management					
Strategic Planning and Staffing Division	1	P-4	Human Resources Officer	New	–
Subtotal	**1**				
Subtotal, Department of Management	**4**				
Office of Internal Oversight Services					
Investigations Division					
New York	1	GS (OL)	Administrative Assistant	New	–
Entebbe	1	P-4	Investigator	Conversion	>5
	3	P-3	Investigator	Conversion	>5
	1	NGS	Administrative Assistant	Conversion	5
Nairobi	1	P-4	Forensic Investigator	Conversion	>5
	1	P-3	Investigator	Conversion	>5
UNMISS	2	P-3	Investigator	Conversion	>5
	1	NGS	Administrative Assistant	Conversion	5
MINUSMA	1	P-5	Chief Resident Auditor	Conversion	5
	1	P-4	Investigator	Conversion	>5
	2	P-3	Investigator	Conversion	>5
	1	NGS	Administrative Assistant	Conversion	5
MONUSCO	1	P-3	Investigator (from MINUSMA)	Conversion	4
MINUSCA	1	P-3	Investigator	Conversion	4
	1	P-3	Investigator	Conversion	>5
Subtotal	**19**				
Internal Audit Division					
UNMIL	(1)	NGS	Administrative Assistant	Abolishment	–
Subtotal	**(1)**				
Subtotal, Office of Internal Oversight Services	**18**				
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights					
Peace Missions Support Section Office					
New York	1	P-4	Human Rights Officer	New	–
Methodology, Education and Training Section					
Geneva	1	P-4	Human Rights Officer	New	–
Subtotal, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights	**2**				
Total posts proposed	**16**				

Annex III

Proposed restructuring, redeployment, reassignment and reclassification of posts under the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019

(Proposals of the Secretary-General contained in document A/72/790)

Restructuring

Redeployments

Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Peace Operations

Office of the Under-Secretary-General

Office of the Chief of Staff Focal Point for Security

Redeployment of 1 post of Occupational Safety Officer (P-4) from Policy, Evaluation and Training Division/Policy and Best Practices Service

Office of Internal Oversight Services

Investigation Division/MINUSCA

Redeployment of 1 post of Investigator (P-4) from MINUJUSTH

Internal Audit Division/New York

Redeployment of 1 post of Resident Auditor (P-4) from MINUJUSTH

Internal Audit Division/UNMISS

Redeployment of 1 post of Resident Auditor (P-4) from UNAMID

Conversion and redeployment

Office of Internal Oversight Services

Investigation Division/MONUSCO

Conversion to post and redeployment of 1 post of Investigator (P-3) from MINUSMA

Reassignments

Office of Internal Oversight Services

Investigations Division/New York

Reassignment of 1 post of Resident Auditor (P-3) from Internal Audit Division/UNAMID as 1 post of Investigator (P-3) in New York

Investigations Division New York

Reassignment of 1 post of Resident Auditor (P-3) from Internal Audit Division/ UNMIL as 1 post of Investigator (P-3) in New York

Reassignment and downward reclassification

Office of Internal Oversight Services

Investigations Division New York

Reassignment of 1 post of Resident Auditor (P-4) from Internal Audit Division/ UNMIL as 1 post of Investigator (P-3) in New York

Annex IV

Proposed general temporary assistance positions under the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019

Proposals of the Secretary-General (see A/72/790)

	Number of posts proposed	*Grade level*	*Functional title*	*Status*	*Number of years continued*
Department of Peacekeeping Operations					
Office of the Under-Secretary-General					
Office of the Chief of Staff	1	GS (OL)	Administrative Assistant (organizational resilience)	Continuation	>5
Executive Office	1	P-4	Human Resources Officer	Continuation	3
	–	3 months, 1 P-4	Leave replacement	Continuation	–
	–	2 months, 1 P-3	Leave replacement	Continuation	–
	–	2 months, 1 GS (OL)	Leave replacement	Continuation	–
Subtotal	**2**				
Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions					
Office of the Assistant Secretary-General	1	P-4	Rule of Law and Security Institutions Officer (MINUSCA)	Continuation	4
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section	1	P-4	Policy and Planning Officer (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration) (MINUSCA)	Continuation	4
Police Division	1	P-4	Police Programme Officer (MINUSCA)	Continuation	4
Justice and Corrections Service	1	P-4	Judicial Affairs Officer	Continuation	>5
Subtotal	**4**				
Subtotal, Department of Peacekeeping Operations	**6**				
United Nations Office to the African Union					
Administrative Support Section	–	3 months, 1 P-3	Leave replacement	Continuation	–
	–	3 months, 1 NGS	Leave replacement	Continuation	–
Subtotal, United Nations Office to the African Union	–				
Department of Field Support					
Office of the Under-Secretary-General					
Conduct and Discipline Unit	1	P-3	Programme Officer	Continuation	1
Audit Response and Boards of Inquiry Section	–	6 months, 1 P-3	Operational Review Officer	Continuation	–
Subtotal	**1**				

	Number of posts proposed	*Grade level*	*Functional title*	*Status*	*Number of years continued*
Field Personnel Division					
Field Personnel Specialist Support Service	10	P-3	Human Resources Officer (occupational groups)	Continuation	>5
	3	GS (OL)	Human Resources Assistant (occupational groups)	Continuation	>5
Subtotal	**13**				
Subtotal, Department of Field Support	**14**				
Department of Management					
Office of the Under-Secretary-General					
Executive Office	–	3 months, 1 P-4	Leave replacement	Continuation	–
	–	3 months, 1 GS (OL)	Leave replacement	Continuation	–
Subtotal	–				
Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts					
Accounts Division	1	P-4	Accountant (accounting policy)	Continuation	1
	1	GS (OL)	Finance Assistant (insurance)	Continuation	>5
Subtotal	**2**				
Office of Human Resources Management					
Medical Service Division	1	P-4	Medical Officer	Continuation	2
Strategic Planning and Staffing Division	1	P-4	Project Manager (data warehouse)	Continuation	>5
	1	P-3	Human Resources Officer (mobility)	Continuation	>5
Subtotal	**3**				
Office of Central Support Services					
Procurement Division	1	GS (OL)	Procurement Assistant	Continuation	>5
Archives and Records Management Service	–	10 months, 1 P-4	Information Management Officer	New	–
Subtotal	**1**				
Office of Information and Communications Technology					
Enterprise applications centre, Bangkok (Bangkok office)	1	P-4	Project Manager (rations management system)	Continuation	4
	1	P-3	Information Systems Officer (fuel management system)	Continuation	>5
Enterprise applications centre, Bangkok (New York office)	1	P-3	Information Systems Officer (customer relationship management solution for troop-contribution management)	Continuation	>5

	Number of posts proposed	Grade level	Functional title	Status	Number of years continued
Enterprise applications centre, New York	1	P-3	Business Analyst (Inspira)	Continuation	>5
Subtotal	**4**				
Subtotal, Department of Management	**10**				
Office of Internal Oversight Services					
Executive Office	–	2 months, 2 P-3	Leave replacement	Continuation	–
	–	2 months, 3 GS (OL)	Leave replacement	Continuation	–
Subtotal	–				
Investigations Division					
New York	1	P-4	Investigator	New	–
	2	P-3	Investigator	New	–
Nairobi	1	P-4	Investigator	New	–
	2	P-3	Investigator	New	–
Vienna	1	D-1	Deputy Director	Continuation	>5
	1	P-5	Senior Investigator	Continuation	>5
	2	P-4	Investigator	Continuation	>5
	1	P-4	Forensic Investigator	Continuation	>5
	5	P-3	Investigator	Continuation	>5
	1	GS (PL)	Investigations Assistant	Continuation	>5
	1	GS (OL)	Investigations Assistant	Continuation	>5
Subtotal	**18**				
Internal Audit Division					
MINUSMA	3	P-4	Resident Auditor (MINUSMA)	Continuation	5
	2	P-3	Resident Auditor (MINUSMA)	Continuation	5
MINUSCA	3	P-4	Resident Auditor (MINUSCA)	Continuation	4
	2	P-3	Resident Auditor (MINUSCA)	Continuation	4
Subtotal	**10**				
Subtotal, Office of Internal Oversight Services	**28**				
Executive Office of the Secretary-General					
	–	3 months, 2 GS (OL)	Leave replacement	Continuation	–
Subtotal, Executive Office of the Secretary-General	–				
Office of the United Nations Ombudsman and Mediation Services					
Regional Ombudsman Office (Entebbe)	2	P-4	Conflict Resolution Officer	Continuation	2
Subtotal, Office of the United Nations Ombudsman and Mediation Services	**2**				

	Number of posts proposed	*Grade level*	*Functional title*	*Status*	*Number of years continued*
Office of Legal Affairs					
General Legal Division					
Administration of justice cluster	–	3 months, 1 P-4	Leave replacement	Continuation	–
Subtotal, Office of Legal Affairs	–				
Department of Public Information	–	1.5 months, 1 P-3	Leave replacement	Continuation	–
	–	1.5 months, 1 GS (OL)	Leave replacement	Continuation	–
Subtotal, Department of Public Information	–				
Secretariat of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions					
	1	P-5	Senior Administrative Officer	Continuation	3
Subtotal, secretariat of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions	**1**				
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights					
Field Operations and Technical Cooperation Division					
Peace Missions Support Section (Addis Ababa)	1	P-3	Human Rights Officer	Continuation	2
Research and Right to Development Division					
Methodology, Education and Training Section (New York)	1	P-4	Human Rights Officer	Continuation	1
Subtotal, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights	**2**				
Total positions (12 months' duration)	**63**				
Total person-months	–				
Discontinuation of positions					
Department of Field Support					
Field Budget and Finance Division					
Memorandum of Understanding and Claims Management Section	(1)	P-3	Finance Officer (MINUSCA)		
Reimbursement Policy and Liaison Section	(1)	GS (OL)	Administrative Assistant		
Office of Internal Oversight Services					
Investigations Division					
UNMIL	(1)	P-5	Chief Resident Investigator		
Total positions discontinued	**(3)**				

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Letter dated 3 May 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh Republic) regarding the legal and historical background of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict (see annex), in reference to the letter dated 3 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/72/508-S/2017/836).

I kindly request that the present letter and its annex be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Zohrab **Mnatsakanyan**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* Reissued for technical reasons on 29 May 2018.

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Annex to the letter dated 3 May 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Artsakh

Memorandum

The current stage of the Azerbaijani-Karabakh conflict is the result of the policy pursued by the Azerbaijani authorities towards the Armenian population of Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh) aimed at extermination and ethnic cleansing of the people of Nagorno Karabakh. Particularly, during the Soviet period the authorities of Azerbaijan had been trying to expel the Armenian population of Artsakh hampering its economic and cultural development and violating individual and collective rights of the Armenian population of Artsakh. The war of 1991–94 and the policy of Azerbaijan throughout the Azerbaijani-Karabakh conflict have clearly demonstrated that the goals and objectives of Azerbaijani leadership to ethnically cleanse the Armenians of Artsakh from the land of their ancestors remained unchanged.

In this respect, the letter of October 3, 2017 of the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General deserves particular attention. Through pseudo-historical arguments, distorted interpretations of international law along with attributing to Azerbaijan an alleged right to unleash a war against the Republic of Artsakh it attempts to justify the ongoing vicious policy of the Azerbaijani leadership.

A close study demonstrates the inadequacy of both historical and legal arguments of the Azerbaijani side, which in their totality are a kind of manifesto about Azerbaijan's intention to further impede the realization by the people of Artsakh of their inalienable individual and collective human rights.

According to well-known sources, since ancient times Artsakh has been one of the provinces of historical Armenia and has never been part of an independent Azerbaijan. Under the pressure of Joseph Stalin, Peoples' Commissar on Nationality Issues of the Soviet Russia, parts of Artsakh were forcefully included within Azerbaijan in 1921 under the name of the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAO). This unlawful act was formalized by the decision of the Caucasus Bureau of the Communist Party of Russia contrary to its previous decision that recognized Artsakh as part of Armenia and in sheer defiance to the will of the people of Artsakh. (see enclosed brief historical reference).

At the same time, the boundaries of the region were drawn in a way that a significant part of Artsakh was left outside. The historic parts of Artsakh were included in different administrative units of Azerbaijan and only the region of Shahumyan remained as a separate administrative unit bordering the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region.

Moreover, the authorities of the Azerbaijani SSR decided to turn the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region into an enclave, and to this end, in 1923, a new administrative entity was invented named Red Kurdistan in the territories between the Armenian SSR and the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region with an administrative center in Lachin (Berdzor). Six years later, in 1929, the Red Kurdistan was abolished, and the constituent territories became separate administrative units of the Azerbaijani SSR. As a result of such manipulations, one third of the Armenian population of Artsakh was left beyond the autonomous region, and the region itself lost the common border with Armenia.

Against this background, the claim of the Azerbaijani side that the administrative borders of the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region "were defined in such a way as to exclude Azerbaijani villages and artificially create a new demographic composition of the region's population" sounds especially cynical.

During the entire period that Artsakh remained within the Azerbaijani SSR, the Azerbaijani leadership with a view to changing the demographic situation pursued a consistent policy of violation of the political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Armenian population. Subsequently the then leader of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev, who ruled Soviet Azerbaijan from 1969 to 1982, admitted that these actions of the Azerbaijani authorities were undertaken with special intent. On July 22, 2002, at a meeting with heads of several Azerbaijani media outlets, referring to the policy he pursued in the 1970s on NKAO, Heydar Aliyev said that he "tried to have more Azerbaijanis in Nagorno Karabakh and that the number of Armenians decreased".[1] During Heydar Aliyev's leadership of Soviet Azerbaijan, the Armenian population of the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast increased only by 1.6%, from 121.1 to 123.1 thousand, while the Azerbaijani population grew by 37%, from 27.2 to 37.3 thousand. Between 1926–1980, the number of Armenian settlements in the NKAO decreased by 27%.

In these circumstances to the peaceful struggle of the people of Artsakh for civil rights, national dignity, economic development, cultural identity, education in the native language, the Azerbaijani leadership reacted with Armenian pogroms in Sumgait, Baku, Kirovabad and other cities of Azerbaijan, along with the operation "Ring" on deportation of the Armenian population of Artsakh and its economic blockade.[2] Thousands of Armenians were killed and maimed, hundreds of thousands were deported.

In the face of Baku's refusal to engage in dialogue and its continued attempts to resolve the conflict by force, proclamation of independence was the only way to ensure the survival of the Armenian population of Artsakh, which realized its right to self-determination in a referendum on December 10, 1991. The Artsakh authorities created the necessary conditions for holding the referendum throughout the Republic, including in the Azerbaijani settlements.[3] However, inhabitants of these settlements refused to participate in the referendum and instead supported the aggression unleashed by the Azerbaijani authorities against Artsakh. On the day of the referendum, Stepanakert and other Armenian settlements were subjected to heavy shelling, leaving 10 civilians dead and eleven wounded.

It should be recalled that the Artsakh Republic gained independence in the context of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and in full compliance with both international law and the then applicable legislation of the USSR. The law "On the

[1] "Zerkalo", July 23, 2002.

[2] Operation "Ring" was carried out in April–August of 1991. As a result, more than two dozen villages of Northern Artsakh, as well as Shahumyan, Hadrut and Shushi regions were completely devastated and destroyed, almost ten thousand people were deported, more than a hundred were killed and several hundred people were taken hostage. At a meeting with the delegation of the First International Congress of the Memory of Andrei Sakharov, head of the ideology department of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party Afrand Dashdamirov and Azerbaijani President Ayaz Mutalibov justified the deportation of the Armenian population of Nagorno Karabakh and did not exclude its continuation (Caroline Cox and John Eibner, "Ethnic Cleansing in Progress: War in Nagorno Karabakh", Institute for Religious Minorities in Islamic World, Zurich, London, Washington 1993).

[3] The NKR Central Election Commission sent a telegram to the administration of the Shushi region with a request to organize the participation of the Azerbaijani population of the region in the referendum. Ballot papers compiled in three languages, Armenian, Azerbaijani and Russian, were sent to the Azerbaijani-populated settlements of the republic.

procedure for resolving issues related to a Union republic's Secession from the USSR" of April 3, 1990, authorized autonomous entities and compact ethnic groups within a Soviet Republic to freely and independently decide their own legal status in case the Republic secedes from the USSR. Following Soviet Azerbaijan's declaration of August 30, 1991 of the restoration of 1918–1920 state independence Nagorno Karabakh initiated the same legal procedure by adopting its own declaration of independence. This referendum, which was held at a time when Nagorno Karabakh was part of the USSR, was fully in line with Soviet law. Hence, the day after the collapse of the Soviet Union two states were created on the territory of the former Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic: the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Over the years, the European Parliament had adopted numerous resolutions in support of Artsakh's strife for self-determination. In its resolution of June 21, 1999 on Nagorno Karabakh, the European Parliament stated that "the autonomous region of Nagorno-Karabakh declared its independence following similar declarations by former Soviet Socialist Republics after the collapse of the USSR in September 1991."

Peoples' right to self-determination is a fundamental right enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and reaffirmed by several other core international documents.

According to international law, Artsakh had the right to create an independent state both as a manifestation of the right to self-determination and in accordance with the right to remedial secession in the face of systematic discrimination, mass violations of human rights, ethnic cleansing and armed aggression by Azerbaijan.

As noted in the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the case of Kosovo, "during the second half of the 20th century, the international law of self-determination developed in such a way as to create a right to independence for the peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation. A great many new States have come into existence as a result of the exercise of this right. There were, however, also instances of declarations of independence outside this context. The practice of States in these latter cases does not point to the emergence in international law of a new rule prohibiting the making of a declaration of independence in such cases".[4]

The International Court of Justice also made an important observation that the scope of the principle of territorial integrity is confined to the sphere of relations between States,[5] thus rejecting the assertion that this principle contains a general prohibition against unilateral declarations of independence.

The evolution of international law convincingly demonstrates the inadmissibility of using the principle of territorial integrity to justify discrimination against certain ethnic groups or peoples and mass violations of human rights and freedoms.

The contemporary international law does not contain any discriminatory provisions with regard to unrecognized states.[6] In this context, the Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) is of particular importance, since in the document the

[4] Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice: Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo. July 22, 2010, para. 79.

[5] Idem, para. 80.

[6] See also the document (A/71/1030-S/2017/727) outlining the position of the Artsakh Republic on the policy of Azerbaijan aimed at isolating Artsakh.

International Court of Justice has developed a position that non-recognition should not lead to depriving people of advantages of international cooperation.

This approach has been further developed in the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. In particular, in the Cyprus v. Turkey case, the ECHR noted that "International Court's Advisory Opinion, read in conjunction with the pleadings and explanations given by some of that court's members, shows clearly that in situations similar to those arising in the present case, the obligation to disregard acts of de facto entities is far from absolute. Life goes on in the territory concerned for its inhabitants. That life must be made tolerable and be protected by the de facto authorities, including their courts; and, in the very interest of the inhabitants, the acts of these authorities related thereto cannot be simply ignored by third States or by international institutions, especially courts, including this one. To hold otherwise would amount to stripping the inhabitants of the territory of all their rights whenever they are discussed in an international context, which would amount to depriving them even of the minimum standard of rights to which they are entitled".[7]

The ECHR further notes that this opinion of the International Court of Justice is "confirmed both by authoritative writers on the subject of de facto entities in international law and by existing practice, particularly judgments of domestic courts on the status of decisions taken by the authorities of de facto entities. This is true, in particular, for private-law relationships and acts of organs of de facto authorities relating to such relationships. Some State organs have gone further and factually recognized even acts related to public-law situations, for example by granting sovereign immunity to de facto entities or by refusing to challenge takings of property by the organs of such entities".[8]

The international judicial practice shows that compliance with the fundamental rights and freedoms of people living in de facto states, as provided for in basic international documents, is a criterion for the legality of the acts of unrecognized states.

As for the desire of the Azerbaijani side to draw parallels between the situation in Namibia and the Azerbaijani-Karabakh conflict, it is worth recalling that the presence of South Africa in Namibia was declared illegal due to South Africa's failure to fulfill its obligations under the mandate of the League of Nations related to ensuring the welfare and security of the indigenous population, as well as respect for its right to self-determination, freedom and independence.[9] As the International Court of Justice noted in its advisory opinion, the system of mandates established in accordance with Article 22 of the Charter of the League of Nations was based on two very important principles: the principle of non-annexation and the principle that the welfare and development of the peoples concerned are sacred heritage of humanity.[10] According to the Court's explanation, given the events that have taken place in the last 50 years, there can hardly be any doubt that the ultimate goal of protecting this sacred heritage is self-determination and independence.[11]

Paradoxically, in an attempt to justify its policy of denial of the rights of the people of Artsakh Republic, the Azerbaijani side refers to the principle of universality

[7] Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. Case of Cyprus v. Turkey (Application no. 25781/94), para. 96. Strasbourg, 10 May 2001.

[8] Idem, para. 97.

[9] UN General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI), UN Security Council Resolutions 264 (1969), 269 (1969) and 276 (1970).

[10] Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21), para. 45.

[11] Idem, para. 53.

of human rights. Meanwhile, this principle, which has acquired special significance with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and now forms the basis of international human rights law, defines that:

- everyone without any exception on social, racial, national, linguistic, religious or other grounds is entitled to all the rights and freedoms;
- rights and freedoms belong to all people, regardless of the state structure, social order, political regime, historical, cultural and religious characteristics, the international status of the country in which these people live;

According to the principle of universality, all human rights constitute an integrated whole, they are interrelated and interdependent: whether they are civil and political rights, such as the right to life, equality before the law, or freedom of expression; economic, social and cultural rights, such as the rights to work, social security and education, or collective rights, such as the rights to development and self-determination. The improvement of one right facilitates advancement of the others. Likewise, the deprivation of one right adversely affects the others.[12]

The constant opposition to these rights by Azerbaijan is a direct violation of the principle of indivisibility and interdependence of human rights.

The attempts of the Azerbaijani side to interpret the UN Security Council resolutions on Nagorno Karabakh and the ECHR judgment in the case of Chiragov and Others v. Armenia as denying the right of the people of Artsakh to self-determination and representing the Azerbaijani-Karabakh conflict as Armenia's aggression against Azerbaijan are also untenable.

The ECHR did not deliver such a judgement. Moreover, according to Article 39 of the UN Charter, the issue of determining an act of aggression is the prerogative of the UN Security Council. The ECHR judgment in the case of Chiragov and Others v. Armenia concerns exclusively to the protection of individual, in particular, property rights.

The Court rejected the assertion of the Azerbaijani side and clarified that the situation pertaining in Nagorno Karabakh "is not one of Armenian State agents exercising authority and control over individuals abroad".[13] The Court noted the assistance provided by Armenia to Nagorno Karabakh, which served as a basis for its final assessment and decision. The ECHR did not deny the existence of both the NKR, although as an unrecognized entity, and a functioning judicial system in Nagorno Karabakh.

It must be stressed that rendering assistance and support, even of a military nature, if occurred, could not be equated with an armed attack. Such a position was elaborated by the UN International Court of Justice in the case of Nicaragua v. United States. The Court also noted the need to "distinguish between the most serious forms of the use of force (constituting an armed attack) and less serious forms".[14]

Despite the Azerbaijani claim the UN Security Council resolutions on the Azerbaijani-Karabakh conflict do not contain references to the aggression, committed against Azerbaijan. All four resolutions of the UN Security Council on the Azerbaijani-Karabakh conflict were adopted during the period of active hostilities, which determined their main requirement to immediately cease fire, as well as all

[12] Official website of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx.

[13] ECHR, Case of Chiragov and Others v. Armenia (Application no. 13216/05), Judgement (Merits), para. 169.

[14] Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, paras 191, 195, 230.

military actions and hostile acts. This main requirement of all resolutions was repeatedly violated by Azerbaijan and has not been fully implemented to this day.

Moreover, Azerbaijan's deliberate policy of destabilization of the situation on the Line of Contact between the armed forces of the Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan, its refusal to implement measures to strengthen confidence and reduce tensions, promotion of xenophobia and hatred against Armenians, rejection of direct talks with Artsakh, attempts to isolate it in every possible way and creating impediments for visits to Artsakh by specialized humanitarian organizations, contradict a whole series of requirements and calls of the UN Security Council resolutions, such as:

- to refrain from any action that will obstruct a peaceful solution to the conflict (Res. 822, 853);
- the immediate cessation of all hostilities and hostile acts with a view to establishing a durable cease-fire (Res. 822)
- to pursue negotiations through direct contacts between the parties (Res. 853);
- an early convening of the CSCE Minsk Conference for the purpose of arriving at a negotiated settlement to the conflict (Res. 874);
- to restore economic, transport and energy links in the region (Res. 853);
- to ensure unimpeded access for international humanitarian relief efforts (Res. 822, 853, 874).

Azerbaijan's failure to comply with the main and other requirements and calls of the four resolutions of the UN Security Council, its push to resolve the conflict by force and the constant threats of resumption of the war have led to a complete breakdown of the UN Security Council resolutions.

All four resolutions very clearly differentiate between the conflict itself and the "deterioration of relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijani Republic and the tensions between them". At the same time, Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh are also clearly indicated as the parties to the conflict (in Res. 822 it is mentioned as "local Armenian forces"). Res. 874 and 884 refer to the "ceasefire established as a result of direct contacts" meaning the bilateral contacts between Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan without the participation of Armenia. The only call to Armenia contained in the UN Security Council resolutions relates to the need to exert influence on Nagorno Karabakh.

The Azerbaijani assertion that adoption of the UN SC resolutions after the declaration of independence of Artsakh makes it clear that the declaration has no legal effect, is yet another example of distorted and biased interpretation of international documents and international law in general by Azerbaijan.

The UN Security Council did not consider the issue of a political settlement to the Azerbaijani-Karabakh conflict, nor did it set limitations on the exercise of the right of the people of Artsakh to self-determination. Instead, the UN Security Council expressed its full support for the efforts to find a peaceful settlement within the framework of the CSCE/OSCE Minsk process.

It should be noted that in some cases the Security Council condemned declarations of independence (see, inter alia, Security Council resolutions 216 (1965) and 217 (1965), concerning Southern Rhodesia; Security Council resolution 541 (1983), concerning northern Cyprus; and Security Council resolution 787 (1992), concerning the Republika Srpska.), if it considered that they were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular those of a peremptory character (jus

cogens).[15] In the context of Artsakh, the Security Council has never taken such a position.

Obviously, by distorting the UN Security Council resolutions and the ECHR judgement, Azerbaijan tries to justify its wish to resolve the Azerbaijani-Karabakh conflict by force, under the guise of the right to self-defense. However, in the context of the Azerbaijani-Karabakh conflict, Baku's reference to the right to self-defense is devoid of legal grounds, both in terms of treaty and customary law.

Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations recognizes the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense "if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security". Self-defense in its broader interpretation, allowing the use of force by a State before it is attacked, i.e. preemptive self-defense, is governed by the rules of common law in accordance with the criteria of necessity and proportionality. These criteria were first formulated by US Secretary of State Daniel Webster in the framework of the Caroline case and provided that self-defense should be conditioned by "instant and overwhelming necessity, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation"; at the same time, "acts justified by the necessity of self-defense, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it". Later, these criteria were confirmed by the UN International Court, which has repeatedly stated that the criteria of "necessity" and "proportionality" are limitations upon the exercise of both individual and collective self-defense.

Thus, Azerbaijan can invoke neither Article 51 of the UN Charter, nor "an instant and overwhelming necessity" for self-defense (since a trilateral ceasefire agreement has been in place since 1994).

Moreover, it was the actions of Azerbaijan that led to the transformation of the political problem into an armed confrontation in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In subsequent years, particularly during the war in 1991–94, Azerbaijan not only rejected numerous proposals by both mediators and Artsakh leadership to establish a ceasefire, but also consistently increased the intensity and scale of hostilities by using newer and more destructive weapons, also against the civilian population. As a result of these actions considerable part of the territory of Artsakh was occupied and its population was subject of mass atrocities including war crimes and ethnic cleansing. Under these conditions, the actions of the Artsakh Defense Army were of a defense nature in repelling the attacks of the Azerbaijani army and neutralizing the strongholds from which attacks and shelling of the Artsakh settlements were carried out. Thus, Azerbaijan is not the victim of war, but the initiator, pursuing the goal of capturing Artsakh by force. The current borderline between Artsakh and Azerbaijan was formed as a result of self-defense exercised by the Artsakh Army to protect the Republic and its population.

The international community also rejected Baku's speculations on its right to self-defense in the context of the Azerbaijani-Karabakh conflict in April 2016, when Azerbaijan launched a large-scale offensive on Artsakh in a flagrant violation of the ceasefire agreement. The OSCE Minsk Group co-chair countries — the United States, Russia, France, as well as the UN Secretary General, the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Secretary General of the Council of Europe were unanimous on the need to strictly observe the 1994 ceasefire agreements and the agreement of 1995 on its reinforcement.

One of the components of the Azerbaijani speculations is the assertion about the alleged illegality of any economic activity in Artsakh. Based on this assumption Baku

[15] Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice: Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo, July 22, 2010.

unilaterally attempts to involve UN member states in the isolation of Artsakh. Such actions by Azerbaijan directly affect the authority and responsibility of the UN Security Council, which did not take any restrictive economic measures against Artsakh. On the contrary, the UN Security Council called for "restoring economic, transport and energy links in the region" (Res. 853).

In addition, in 2001 the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs made a proposal for economic cooperation between Azerbaijan and Artsakh, in particular, in the joint use of water resources as a confidence-building measure. The Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group repeated the above proposal in their May 20, 2014 statement.

Economic cooperation with a view to creating a favorable situation in the process of the political settlement of the Azerbaijani-Karabakh conflict was also proposed in the context of civilian peace initiatives by a consortium of international non-governmental organizations, and later in the framework of the EU-funded EPNK initiative.

However, these proposals have been rejected by Azerbaijan, which does not hide that it views the economy not as a means to peace building but as continuation and intensification of confrontation. In an effort to isolate Artsakh, the Azerbaijani authorities hope to create favorable conditions for the resumption of hostilities.

As part of this policy, the Azerbaijani authorities are taking consistent steps to disrupt the peace process, under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs — the United States, Russia and France. Rejecting any proposals to strengthen the ceasefire and restore confidence and refusing to implement the agreements reached, Azerbaijan strives to bring the settlement process to a standstill, which, according to the Azerbaijani authorities, can justify the use of force.

Such an approach was vividly evident in the preparations of Azerbaijan for the attack against Artsakh in April 2016. The resumption of large-scale hostilities by Azerbaijan in April 2016 was preceded by Baku's refusal to meet with the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group in late 2015 and early 2016 and the statement of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on March 19, 2016 that Azerbaijan's faith in the activities of the mediators had been completely undermined.[16]

Undermining any peacebuilding initiatives, aggressively imposing the logic of confrontation, trying to unleash a new war, the Azerbaijani authorities hope to change the course of the Azerbaijani-Karabakh conflict settlement, in which the tendency to an ever-greater recognition of the decisive role of the people of Artsakh in determining its future is clearly traced.

The President of Azerbaijan disclosed the reason for such behavior of the Azerbaijani side at a government meeting on October 7, 2016. Commenting on the process of the Azerbaijani-Karabakh conflict settlement, Ilham Aliyev said that behind closed doors, there was an international pressure on Baku to agree to the independence of Nagorno Karabakh.[17]

The Azerbaijani-Karabakh conflict, which began with the mass violations of the rights of the Armenian population of Artsakh, continues to this day precisely because of the unwillingness of the Azerbaijani side to abandon its policy of denying the

[16] Speech by President Ilham Aliyev at the nationwide festivities on the occasion of Novruz holiday. Official website of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, March 19, 2016 http://en.president.az/articles/19436.

[17] Opening speech by President Ilham Aliyev at a meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers on the results of the socioeconomic development in the nine months of 2016 and future objectives. Official website of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, October 7, 2016 http://en.president.az/articles/21318.

individual and collective rights of citizens of the Republic of Artsakh. This policy, expressed, inter alia, in an effort to isolate Artsakh, together with the ongoing military provocations by the Azerbaijani side, is not only a violation of Azerbaijan's international obligations, but also a serious threat to peace and security in the South Caucasus.

Brief Historical Reference

According to the well-known historical documents, since ancient times Artsakh has been one of the provinces of historical Armenia, as evidenced by, inter alia, the works of Strabo, Pliny the Elder, Claudius Ptolemy, Plutarch, Dio Cassius and other ancient authors. After the division of the Kingdom of Greater Armenia in 387, Artsakh along with the whole of Eastern Armenia fell under the domination of Persia. During the period of Arab expansion, Artsakh was part of the governorship of Armenia. In the 9th–11th centuries, Artsakh was part of the Armenian Kingdom of the Bagratids, and in the 12th and 13th centuries, the Armenian Principality of Zakharids. In the following centuries, Artsakh fell under the domination of Persia again, retaining, however, a semi-independent status. The region was governed by Armenian meliks, hereditary feudal lords, who managed to preserve de facto sovereignty with total independence in internal matters such as the court system, tax collection and the right to have their own army. Turkic tribes began to infiltrate Artsakh only from the middle of the 18th century, which led to clashes with the indigenous Armenian population. Since then, the region received another name — "Karabakh".

In the 50s of the 18th century, taking advantage of the internal strife among the Armenian meliks, Panah, the leader of one of the Turkic nomadic tribes infiltrated into Artsakh. This marked the beginning of a lengthy war with Armenian meliks.

As a result of the Russo-Persian wars of 1804–1813 and 1826–1828, Eastern Armenia, including Artsakh-Karabakh became part of the Russian Empire.

During the collapse of the Russian Empire in the early 20th century, newly created Azerbaijan, which never had a statehood before, laid claims not only on areas with compact Muslim population, but also on territories populated overwhelmingly by Armenians, including Artsakh-Karabakh, thus giving rise to the conflict.

Initially, the Azerbaijani leadership expected to achieve its goals with the help of Ottoman troops, who invaded the South Caucasus. The short period of occupation of parts of South Caucasus by Ottoman Army was marked by mass-atrocities against the Armenian population. The anti-Armenian pogroms were planned in advance and committed by Ottoman-Azerbaijani troops and local gangs. The massacre of Armenians of Baku alone, in September 1918 led to the death of around 30 thousand Armenians.

On June 4, 1918, Armenia, under conditions of continuing Ottoman aggression, was forced to sign the Treaty of Batum, according to which the Ottoman Empire got significant territorial gains in the west of Armenia, while Azerbaijan, taking the advantage of Ottoman presence in the region, laid territorial claims to Armenia.

At the time when the Treaty of Batum was imposed on Armenia, on July 22, 1918 the First Assembly of Armenians of Karabakh was convened, which declared Karabakh a separate administrative and political entity and formed an independent government. All attempts of Azerbaijan to forcefully annex territory of Karabakh in 1919–1920 failed. The military aggression of Azerbaijan against the Armenians of Karabakh was combined by mass atrocities, in particular in March, 1920, the Azerbaijani forces and armed gangs looted and set to fire the Armenian quarters of Shushi carrying out massacre of Armenian population of Shushi and driving them out of the city. However, the Batum Agreement was never ratified by Armenia and after

the defeat of the Ottoman Turkey in WWI it had lost its effect completely. The issue of determining the final status of Karabakh was transferred to the Paris Peace Conference.

The Azerbaijani territorial claims were not recognized at the international level either. On December 1, 1920, the Fifth Committee of the League of Nations rejected the request of Azerbaijan for admission to the League of Nations, justifying its decision by Azerbaijan's lack of established state borders.

After the Sovietization of the republics of the South Caucasus, on November 30, 1920, the government of Soviet Azerbaijan announced the recognition of Nagorno Karabakh, Zangezur and Nakhijevan as an integral part of Soviet Armenia. Later, however, with the support of Joseph Stalin, People's Commissar on Nationality Issues of Soviet Russia, Azerbaijan once again renewed its claims on Karabakh. On June 5, 1921, the Caucasus Bureau of the Communist Party of Russia, under the pressure of Stalin and contrary to its previous decision and the will of the people of Karabakh, decided to include Karabakh within Azerbaijan as an autonomous region.

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Strengthening of the United Nations system

United Nations reform: measures and proposals

Programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019

Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations

Revised estimates relating to the programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019 under section 3, Political affairs, and section 5, Peacekeeping operations, and the proposed budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019 related to the peace and security reform

Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

I. Introduction

1. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has considered the report of the Secretary-General on revised estimates relating to the programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019 under section 3, Political affairs, and section 5, Peacekeeping operations, and the proposed budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019 related to the peace and security reform (A/72/772). During its consideration of the report, the Advisory Committee met with representatives of the Secretary-General, who provided additional information and clarification, concluding with written responses received on 3 May 2018.

II. Background

2. The Advisory Committee recalls that, in October 2017, the Secretary-General submitted his report to the General Assembly on restructuring of the United Nations peace and security pillar (A/72/525), in which he outlined four main goals of the

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proposed reform to restructure the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Peacebuilding Support Office (see A/72/525, sects. III and IV). The four main goals are as follows: (a) prioritize prevention and sustaining peace; (b) enhance the effectiveness and coherence of peacekeeping operations and special political missions, ensuring the primacy of politics and flexibility of approach; (c) make the peace and security pillar more coherent, nimble and effective through a "whole-of-pillar" approach to address fragmentation; and (d) align the peace and security pillar more closely with the development and human rights pillars (ibid., para. 14).

3. Subsequently, in its resolution 72/199, the General Assembly took note of the report of the Secretary-General and supported his vision for reforming the peace and security pillar. In the same resolution, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit to it, as soon as possible, a comprehensive report on his peace and security pillar reform proposal, elaborating on the establishment of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Department of Peace Operations, including detailed information on the proposed functions, structure and staffing requirements, for the consideration of and decision by the Assembly, in accordance with established procedures. **The Advisory Committee notes that the General Assembly has supported the vision of the Secretary-General for reforming the peace and security pillar as envisaged in his report on restructuring of the United Nations peace and security pillar (A/72/525).**

III. New structure proposed by the Secretary-General

4. The Secretary-General indicates that his report (A/72/772) is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 72/199 (see A/72/772, para. 1) (see also para. 28 below). He also indicates that his proposal is centred on the creation of two new departments, with a single regional political-operational structure, and supported by an Office of the Director for Coordination and Shared Services. The proposal is explained in sections III to V of the report of the Secretary-General and the proposed organization charts are presented in annexes I to V to that report (A/72/772). The new structure, proposed to take effect on 1 January 2019, is outlined below (ibid., paras. 3 and 4 and sects. III, IV and V):

(a) The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, which would combine the strategic, political and operational responsibilities of the Department of Political Affairs and the peacebuilding responsibilities of the Peacebuilding Support Office. The Department would have seven components: (i) Office of the Under-Secretary-General; (ii) Policy and Mediation Division; (iii) Electoral Assistance Division; (iv) Security Council Affairs Division; (v) Division for Palestinian Rights; (vi) Decolonization Unit; and (vii) Peacebuilding Support Office;

(b) The Department of Peace Operations, which would include the strategic, political and operational responsibilities of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the responsibilities of the Department of Political Affairs for those field-based special political missions that would henceforth be placed under its purview. The Department would have four components: (i) Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations; (ii) Office of Military Affairs; (iii) Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions; and (iv) Policy, Evaluation and Training Division;

(c) A single regional political-operational structure, to be shared by the two new departments, would be responsible for the day-to-day management of all political and operational peace and security activities. The structure would be headed by three Assistant Secretaries-General, who would report to the Under-Secretaries-General of

the two departments. The three Assistant Secretaries-General would cover, respectively: (i) Africa; (ii) Europe, Central Asia and Americas; and (iii) Middle East, Asia and the Pacific;

(d) Office of the Director for Coordination and Shared Services: it is proposed to redeploy the current post of Chief of Staff of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support as the Director for Coordination and Shared Services of the Department of Peace Operations and the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. The post of Director would be maintained at the current D-2 level, financed from the peacekeeping support account, and would report to the Under-Secretaries-General of both departments to ensure coherence and consistency with regard to management, administration, budgetary and similar processes across the pillar. The Director would also oversee the joint Executive Office, the Leadership Support Section[1] (see also para. 7 (b) below), the Peacekeeping Situation Centre (including the contributions of both departments to the United Nations Operations and Crisis Centre),[2] the Strategic Communications Section, the Focal Point for Security, the Information Management Unit and the Registry. Upon enquiry, it was confirmed to the Advisory Committee that, in organizational terms, the Office of the Director for Coordination and Shared Services is indeed a division and not comparable to the front offices of the two Under-Secretaries-General of the two departments.

Proposed resource changes

5. The Secretary-General indicates that his proposal would be cost neutral and would not change the mandates, functions or main funding sources established for the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations or the Peacebuilding Support Office. The use of the support account for peacekeeping operations and the regular budget will remain unchanged, with the exception of the three support account posts being proposed for transfer from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to the Peacebuilding Support Office (see A/72/772, paras. 3, 6 and 7; see also para. 27 (b) below).

6. It is further indicated that the proposed movement of posts on this basis would entail the redistribution of resources within the current appropriation under the approved programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019 and the proposed budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations for the 2018/19 period, effective 1 January 2019. In this regard, the budget implications for both are presented in section VIII of the report of the Secretary-General. Tables 1 and 2 therein illustrate the movement of human and financial resources between subprogrammes and sections under the proposal (see A/72/772, paras. 6 and 124).

7. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was provided with information on the movement of resources and posts among the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support, the Department of Political Affairs and the Peacebuilding Support Office, as follows:

[1] Proposed to replace the current Senior Leadership Appointment Section under the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support (A/72/772, para. 12 (i)).

[2] As of January 2017, the Secretary-General decided that the United Nations Operations and Crisis Centre would report directly to the Assistant Secretary-General for Strategic Coordination in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General in order to improve and integrate information flow and the coordination of situational awareness and crisis response (see A/72/772, para. 109 and footnote 1).

(a) A total of $270,000, including three posts (2 P-4 and 1 P-2), from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to the Peacebuilding Support Office under other assessed resources (i.e., the support account for peacekeeping operations);

(b) A total of $430,100, for the Senior Leadership Appointments Section, from the Department of Field Support to the Office of the Director for Coordination and Shared Services of the new Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Department of Peace Operations, including five posts (1 P-5, 1 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 General Service (Principal level) and 1 General Service (Other level)), under other assessed resources (see para. 44 below);

(c) A total of $531,100, including three posts (1 D-1, 1 P-5, 1 General Service (Other level)), from the Department of Political Affairs to the Peacebuilding Support Office under the programme budget;

(d) A total of $181,600 (1 P-4 post), from the Department of Political Affairs to the Peacebuilding Support Office under extra-budgetary resources.

8. **The Advisory Committee would have expected some efficiencies to be derived from a restructuring initiative of this magnitude (see also paras. 39–41 below) and more detailed information on the proposed functions, structures and staffing requirements as requested by the General Assembly (see para. 3 above), as well as the potential impact on mandate implementation (see para. 15 below). The Committee also notes from the information provided to it that the proposed changes in resources are mostly related to post changes, while minor changes are reflected under non-post resources after the proposed restructuring. The Committee has no objection to the revised estimates relating to the programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019 and the related part of the proposed budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations for 2018/19, subject to its comments and recommendations in the present report.**

9. In addition, the Advisory Committee notes, from annex IV to the report of the Secretary-General (A/72/772), that a number of posts and positions in the Executive Office of the Office of Director for Coordination and Shared Services relate to the proposed Department of Operational Support under the management reform[3] (see also sect. V below). **The recommendations of the Committee on the proposed management reform and the global service delivery model will be contained in its forthcoming reports.**

1. Single regional political-operational structure

10. The Secretary-General proposes combining the current regional divisions of the Department of Political Affairs and the Office of Operations of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations into a single regional political-operational structure (regional structure) that would be shared by the proposed Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Department of Peace Operations. According to the Secretary-General, the establishment of such a regional structure is at the core of his efforts to integrate the political and operational responsibilities currently residing in two different departments and to develop a holistic peace and security pillar instead of silos and separations (ibid., para. 52).

Roles, responsibilities and reporting lines

11. The single regional structure, to be shared by the two new departments, would be headed by three Assistant Secretaries-General, who would report to the Under-Secretaries-General of the two departments (see para. 4 (c) above). The three

[3] Proposed under the management reform by the Secretary-General in document A/72/492/Add.2.

Assistant Secretaries-General would report to: (a) the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs on the global political mandate of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs; and (b) to the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations on issues related to peacekeeping operations, as well as the field-based special political missions under the purview of the Department of Peace Operations (see A/72/772, paras. 4 and 58–63).

12. The Secretary-General states that the Under-Secretaries-General of the two new departments would work as a team to ensure coherence and a "whole-of-pillar" approach. They would consult closely with each other in providing advice to the Secretary-General and in giving coherent guidance and direction to the Assistant Secretaries-General leading the regional structure, in particular in relation to countries and regions where their respective responsibilities are closely interrelated. Furthermore, the Secretary-General would establish, under his chairmanship, a Standing Principals' Group,[4] which, serving as an internal management and coordination forum, would meet regularly, but would not be part of the institutional structure of the pillar (see A/72/772, para. 5). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the Standing Principals' Group would determine its own working and consultation methods and would have the following main functions: (a) to ensure the delivery of advice, based on close consultation and coordination, to the Secretary-General on peace and security matters; (b) to ensure a "whole of pillar" approach by providing coherent and unified leadership and strategic guidance to the peace and security pillar, in particular to the single regional structure, as well as to field presences; and (c) to ensure close coordination and consultation on an ongoing basis with the heads of the offices participating in the Group. **The Committee stresses the importance of ensuring that the Standing Principals' Group would function as intended.**

13. The Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that as with any organizational restructuring, the proposal carries some challenges and potential risks that can be mitigated or addressed through good management. The dual reporting responsibilities would need careful management and coordination, requiring the two Under-Secretaries-General to work closely and collaboratively on a consistent basis, while the three Assistant Secretaries-General would need to be guided by coordinated leadership and direction from the top. Staff would require a period of adjustment and reorientation, in particular in the combined new regional divisions under the regional structure. Teams and divisions would have a mixture of political and operational responsibilities in mission and non-mission settings. Individuals who might hitherto have focused largely on specific dossiers would need to broaden their horizons as they integrate into divisions with a wider remit. In addition, working more collaboratively, including in conducting analysis collectively or jointly, would require leadership that cultivates a stronger team-oriented approach. Lastly, the working methods and institutional cultures of the two departments and the Peacebuilding Support Office would need to be gradually harmonized. **The Committee trusts that the two Under-Secretaries-General would collaborate and work together in support of a coherent and "whole-of-pillar" approach.**

14. Concerning the dual reporting lines of the three Assistant Secretaries-General, the Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that there were two main factors in relation to ensuring coherent guidance and tasking: first, clearly defined areas of responsibilities for the two Under-Secretaries-General, as described in paragraphs 20 and 47 of the report of the Secretary-General; and second, close and

[4] Consisting of the Under-Secretaries-General of the two departments, of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism and of the Office for Disarmament Affairs and other senior officials, with a view to providing unified leadership for strategic, political and operational responsibilities to facilitate the whole-of-pillar approach and cross-pillar coherence at Headquarters and in the field.

continuous consultation between the two Under-Secretaries-General, including through the Standing Principals' Group under the Chairmanship of the Secretary-General.

15. **Considering the need for the Standing Principals' Group to function in an effective manner, and the risks associated with the potential lack of clarity deriving from dual reporting lines, the Advisory Committee recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to review and report on the functioning of the new structure. In addition, the Committee notes the absence of information pertaining to the individual components (such as services, sections and units) in each division of the proposed single regional structure, as the information is provided only at the division level (see A/72/772, sect. IV and annex V). The Committee trusts that detailed information will be provided to the General Assembly at the time of its consideration of the present report.**

Regional divisions

16. The Secretary-General proposes the establishment of seven regional divisions, under the responsibility of the three Assistant Secretaries-General in the regional structure, to be led by directors at the D-2 level. The divisions would have responsibility for the broad spectrum of United Nations work relating to early warning, prevention of conflict, peacebuilding, mediation and sustaining peace and peace operations in designated subregions or geographical areas. The directors would report directly to the Assistant Secretaries-General on their respective portfolios (ibid., para. 64). The responsibilities of the directors and the regional divisions are described in paragraphs 65 to 67 of the report of the Secretary-General (A/72/772).

17. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the merger of the regional divisions is a new and unified approach to the delivery of existing mandates, while respecting the approved biennial programme of work (see para. 35 below). Staff of the two new departments, who would cover the entire range of peace and security functions within the defined geographical area, would be structurally integrated into the same division, under the same director and Assistant Secretary-General.

18. It is proposed that the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa would oversee three divisions as follows: (a) West and Central Africa; (b) North Africa and the Horn of Africa; and (c) Southern Africa and Great Lakes (ibid., para. 70). The three divisions would undertake all the current mandated tasks and functions carried out by the four existing Africa Divisions in the Department of Political Affairs and the Office of Operations of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. This would include the provision of strategic, political and operational guidance and support to 10 special political missions and 7 peacekeeping operations (ibid., para. 71). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that, while the Secretary-General had considered other ways of delineating the regional divisions for Africa, including the creation of four distinct and geographically based divisions, he believes the proposal for three regional divisions to be the most practical and achievable within the parameters of cost neutrality and workload distribution. Furthermore, under the proposed arrangement, each of the three divisions would provide adequate coverage at Headquarters, with the fourth D-2 post proposed in order to support a priority area of work, namely the Sahel (see paras. 21 and 22 below). The Committee was further informed that stand-alone divisions for Central Africa and for West Africa and the Sahel would be possible. If all of the posts of the current four Africa divisions were to be retained within the new single regional structure, this would mean that three of the posts proposed for redeployment to the Peacebuilding Support Office could not be redeployed (1 P-5 Senior Political Affairs Officer from the Africa II Division of the Department of Political Affairs, 1 P-4 Political Affairs Officer from the Somalia Coordination and Planning Team of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and

1 Assistant (General Service (Other level)) from the Africa II Division of the Department of Political Affairs). The Committee was informed that this would significantly diminish efforts to strengthen the Office (see also paras. 27–32 below).

19. With respect to the proposed transfer of functions related to Central Asia to the proposed Europe, Central Asia and Americas Division, the Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that currently one P-4, funded from extra-budgetary resources, is focused on Central Asia in the Middle East and West Asia Division of the Department of Political Affairs. Under the proposal, that P-4 post would be part of the Europe and Central Asia Division and would be placed in the team responsible for Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The Committee was further informed that several ways of delineating regional divisions had been considered and that the major considerations include: existing divisional configurations and available staffing in current divisions; geopolitical factors and thematic/cross-regional issues; the existence and configuration of regional and subregional organizations; and the need to achieve a balance between mission mandates and non-mission responsibilities in a given division; as well as prospects for special political mission and peacekeeping missions working more closely together. The proposed restructuring does not therefore imply a change in political emphasis vis-à-vis the regional divisions. Moreover, the Committee was informed that the areas of priority for sections 3 and 5 of the programme budget would not change under the proposed structure (see also para. 36 below).

20. **The Advisory Committee is of the view that the appropriateness and functioning of the arrangement proposed for the regional divisions under the single regional political-operational structure need to be assessed, as appropriate, against the workload of the regional divisions, in particular those in Africa, where the peace and security work of the Organization is significant, to ensure the implementation of mandates in the most effective and efficient manner.**

Relocation of a D-2 post to Nouakchott

21. Concerning the West and Central Africa Division, it is indicated that the Secretary-General has made significant efforts to reinvigorate the implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel, as detailed in his report to the Security Council on the activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) (S/2017/1104). In order to support those efforts, the Division would comprise a D-2-level director dedicated to the Sahel dossier, to be based in Nouakchott. The Director would further assist the implementation of the strategy and support the efforts to assist the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, serving as the main United Nations liaison with and entry point for interactions with the secretariat of the Group. The Director would liaise with Member States and regional, international and non-governmental entities. While having a functional link to the Division, the Director would work under the overall supervision of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel and Deputy Special Representative (see A/72/772, para. 78). **The Advisory Committee notes that the relocation of the D-2 post from New York to Nouakchott, is not included in the summary of post changes listed in paragraph 123 of the report of the Secretary-General (A/72/772).**

22. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that UNOWAS remains central in the efforts to recalibrate the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel as required by its mandate, which encompasses support to the implementation of the strategy and the coordination of international and regional engagements in the Sahel. Furthermore, the Committee was informed that the proposed D-2 Director would also coordinate, through UNOWAS, with the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General for

the Sahel. In that connection, the Committee recalls that it was informed on 20 March 2018 that the Secretary-General had decided to establish the position of Special Adviser for the Sahel, at the level of Assistant Secretary-General, based in Dakar, for a period of 11 months (starting from 1 April 2018), funded by voluntary contributions, via a "50/50" arrangement between the United Nations and the United Nations Development Programme. The Special Adviser will work in close collaboration with UNOWAS and the United Nations Development Group and be responsible for assisting with overall oversight and coordination for the implementation for the strategy. The incumbent will also liaise with the multiple actors in the region and engage with national and regional authorities and international partners. **Taking into account the functions currently assigned to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel and the recently appointed Special Adviser for the Sahel (Assistant Secretary-General), the Committee is not convinced of the justification provided for the relocation of the D-2 post from New York to Nouakchott in the context of the proposal. The Committee requests that more information be provided to the General Assembly at the time of its consideration of the present report.**

2. Field-based special political missions proposed to be placed under the purview of the Department of Peace Operations

23. As indicated in paragraph 10 above, the Secretary-General proposes that the Department of Peace Operations assume the responsibilities of the existing Department of Political Affairs with respect to two field-based special political missions: the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) (see A/72/772, para. 3).

24. The Advisory Committee enquired as to the criteria for proposing an alternative arrangement for UNAMA and UNAMI, noting that these two missions are currently included in the 11 field-based special political missions under thematic cluster III according to the established categorization in the programme budget (among them the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia (see A/72/7/Add.10, p. 3). The Committee was informed that the nature and scale of special political missions vary considerably and that, under the current circumstances, the Secretary-General considers that UNAMA and UNAMI are the most appropriate for management by the Department of Peace Operations, and that UNAMA, for most of its existence, has been managed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The Committee was further informed that future decisions on the management of field-based special political missions might need to be made on a case-by-case basis until a definitive set of criteria could be arrived at through experience.

25. **The Advisory Committee is of the view that a clear set of criteria should have been set out for the transfer of the backstopping of field-based special political missions to the proposed Department of Peace Operations, in particular taking into account the experience that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations had gained through the management of UNAMA until 30 September 2014 and the rationale for the transfer of the lead responsibility to the Department of Political Affairs since that time (see para. 26 below). The Committee recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to set out a clear set of such criteria with a view to ensuring clarity and that logical and consistent organizational backstopping arrangements are in place to service field-based special political missions.**

26. A related matter is the funding of backstopping capacity at Headquarters. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that, while UNAMA and UNAMI would remain special political missions and that the proposed budgets for the two

missions would continue to be reflected under section 3, Political affairs, of the programme budget, substantive backstopping at Headquarters would be provided by the Department of Peace Operations. As for the funding of the backstopping posts for UNAMA at Headquarters, the Committee recalls that, upon transfer of the lead responsibility for UNAMA from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to the Department of Political Affairs as at 1 October 2014, three posts (1 P-5, 1 P-4 and 1 P-3) funded under the support account for 2014/15 were temporarily loaned from the then-disbanded Afghanistan integrated operational team in the Office of Operations of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to the Department of Political Affairs and that the posts were later established under UNAMA budget from 1 January 2015 (see A/69/628, paras. 42 and 43). **The Committee notes that no information is provided in the report on the funding of the backstopping capacity for UNAMA and UNAMI at Headquarters as a result of the proposed transfer to the Department of Peace Operations from 1 January 2019. The Committee trusts that information in this regard will be provided to the General Assembly at the time of its consideration of the present report.**

3. Peacebuilding Support Office

27. It is proposed to strengthen the Peacebuilding Support Office by transferring a total of seven posts (3 posts funded from the programme budget, 3 posts funded from the support account and 1 post funded from extrabudgetary resources), which is made possible through the capacities freed up by the merger of the regional divisions and the creation of a single executive office for the two new departments (see A/72/772, para. 122). The proposed transfer of the seven posts are as follows (ibid., para. 123):

(a) Under the programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019, the redeployment of: (i) one Assistant General Service (Other level) from the Africa II Division of the Department of Political Affairs to the Office of the Assistant Secretary-General; (ii) one Senior Political Affairs Officer (P-5) from the Africa II Division of the Department of Political Affairs to the Peacebuilding Strategy and Partnership Branch; and (iii) the reassignment of one Executive Officer (D-1) from the Executive Office of the Department of Political Affairs as Principal Political Affairs Officer in the Peacebuilding Commission Support Branch;

(b) Under the support account for peacekeeping operations for 2018/19, the redeployment of: (i) one Associate Political Affairs Officer (P-2) from the Asia, Middle East, Europe and Latin America Division of the Office of Operations of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to the Office of the Assistant Secretary-General; (ii) one Political Affairs Officer (P-4) from the Somalia Coordination and Planning Team of the Office of Operations of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to the Peacebuilding Commission Support Branch; and (iii) one Political Affairs Officer (P-4) from the Partnership Team of the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to the Peacebuilding Strategy and Partnerships Branch;

(c) Under extrabudgetary resources, the redeployment of one Political Affairs Officer (P-4) from the Policy Planning Unit of the Policy and Mediation Division of the Department of Political Affairs to the Peacebuilding Strategy and Partnerships Branch.

28. On a related matter, the Advisory Committee notes that the Secretary-General submitted a report on peacebuilding and sustaining peace (A/72/707-S/2018/43) on 18 January 2018, pursuant to paragraph 30 of General Assembly resolution 70/262 and Security Council resolution 2282 (2016) on the review of the peacebuilding architecture. In that report, the Secretary-General proposes that the capacity of the Peacebuilding Support Office be strengthened within the existing resources of the

peace and security pillar. He also asks Member States to consider favourably his detailed proposals for the restructuring of the peace and security pillar and to enhance the capacities of the Peacebuilding Support Office and other parts of the proposed Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, including through the use of the peacekeeping support account for peacebuilding activities in relevant peacekeeping settings (see A/72/707-S/2018/43, para. 20). Upon enquiry, the Committee was informed that the Secretary-General is not proposing further use of resources funded from the support account in other parts of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs.

29. With regard to the relationship of the two reports on the restructuring of the peace and security pillar and on peacebuilding and sustaining peace (A/72/772 and A/72/707-S/2018/43), in particular in terms of strengthening the Peacebuilding Support Office, the Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that the report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding and sustaining peace (A/72/707-S/2018/43) connects the revitalization of the Peacebuilding Support Office with the proposed restructuring of the peace and security pillar, building upon its existing work in support of the development-humanitarian-peacebuilding continuum. The Secretary-General indicates that the Office will function as a "hinge" between the peace and security pillar and the other pillars and with the humanitarian community (ibid., para. 19). The Committee was further informed that, since the revitalization of the Support Office is linked to the restructuring of the peace and security pillar, the outcome of the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on peacebuilding and sustaining peace on 24 and 25 April 2018 would not result in additional revised estimates for the revitalization of the Office.[5]

30. The Advisory Committee was also informed, upon enquiry, that the Support Office would continue to rely on secondments from United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and the use of Junior Professional Officers, in particular for vital policy-related tasks. In addition, the staffing needs of the Financing for Peacebuilding Branch would continue to be met through overhead charges to the Peacebuilding Fund (extrabudgetary resources) and, if contributions to the Fund were to increase, leading to the Fund programming a greater volume of resources, there could be an increase in both staffing requirements and posts for the Branch.

31. Concerning the reassignment of the D-1 post of the Executive Officer from the Executive Office of the Department of Political Affairs as Principal Political Affairs Officer in the Peacebuilding Commission Support Branch (see para. 27 (a) (iii) above), the Advisory Committee notes that the functions of this post would change fundamentally. **The Committee reiterates that posts should either be utilized for the purposes for which they were intended or proposed for abolishment (see A/72/7, para. 98). The Committee therefore recommends that the D-1 post of the Executive Officer in the Department of Political Affairs should be abolished and be established as a Principal Political Affairs Officer in the Peacebuilding Commission Support Branch, with the application of a 50 per cent vacancy rate for 2019, following the established budget methodology for the programme budget (ibid., para. 44).**

32. With respect to the proposed redeployment of three posts (2 P-4 and 1 P-2) funded under the support account from the Office of Operations of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to the Peacebuilding Support Office (see para. 27 (b) above), the Secretary-General indicates that, under his proposal, the use of the support account for peacekeeping operations and the regular budget would remain

[5] The General Assembly adopted resolution 72/276.

unchanged,* with the exception of those three support account posts to perform tasks that are significantly related to peacekeeping and intended to support the growing emphasis of Member States on the peacebuilding objectives under peacekeeping mandates (see A/72/772, paras. 7 and 28). **The Advisory Committee recalls that the General Assembly has decided and reaffirmed that the support account funds shall be used for the sole purpose of financing human resources and non-human resources requirements for backstopping and supporting peacekeeping operations at Headquarters, and that any changes in this limitation require the prior approval of the General Assembly (see General Assembly resolutions 49/250 and 71/295). Moreover, the Assembly has recognized the temporary nature of support account posts and decided in this regard that measures introduced by the Secretary-General in connection with the regular budget shall not be extended to those posts (see General Assembly resolution 50/221 A). In the absence of a policy change by the General Assembly, the Committee recommends against the proposed redeployment of the three posts (2 P-4 and 1 P-2) funded under the support account from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to the Peacebuilding Support Office. The three posts should therefore be abolished, as at 1 January 2019, in the context of the proposed budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations for 2019/19 (see A/72/857). Related non-post resources should be adjusted accordingly.**

4. Gender units of the two new departments

33. It is indicated that the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations would comprise a front office, including a Gender Unit (1 P-5, 1 P-4, 1 P-3 and 1 General Service (Other level)) to be transferred from the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which would work closely with the Gender, Peace and Security Team in the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs to ensure a holistic approach to women and peace and security issues through their distinct mandates (see A/72/772, para. 48). Upon enquiry as to why it is proposed to have two separate units for gender-related issues in the two new departments, the Advisory Committee was informed that the two departments' gender entities have complementary but different functions and expertise, including in the areas of policy development, operational engagement and programming. While the focus of the gender unit of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (1 P-5, 1 P-4 and 1 P-3) is on conflict prevention, mediation support, and women's political participation related to peacemaking and peacebuilding, the women, peace and security mandate is related to the management of and response to conflict, as well as sustaining peace and prevention through peacekeeping.

34. **The Advisory Committee is not convinced of the justification provided for having two separate units on gender-related issues for the two new departments. The Committee is of the view that a single and merged gender unit under the pillar would enhance policy coherence and could lead to greater efficiency and effectiveness in line with the whole-of-pillar approach for the proposed restructuring of the peace and security pillar.**

* The Secretary-General indicates in his report on the management reform that he wishes to submit a proposal to the General Assembly at the second part of its seventy-fourth session to establish a clear and consistent approach to financing the two new departments for operational support and management from the support account based on the initial experience gained from the implementation of the "whole-of-the-Secretariat" approach (A/72/492/Add.2, para. 66).

IV. Relationship to the biennial programme plan, the programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019 and the support account for peacekeeping operations

Biennial programme plan and programme budget

35. The Secretary-General indicates that his proposals set out in the report (A/72/772) do not give rise to any changes in the approved objectives, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievements or outputs related to programme 2, Political affairs, and programme 4, Peacekeeping operations, of the biennial programme plan for the period 2018–2019 (A/71/6/Rev.1) or to section 3, Political affairs, and section 5, Peacekeeping operations, of the programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019 (A/72/6 (Sect. 3) and A/72/6 (Sect. 5)) (see A/72/772, para. 10). Nonetheless, the modifications required throughout the programmes of the biennial programme plan for the period 2018–2019 (A/71/6/Rev.1) and throughout the sections of the programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019 (A/72/6 (Sect. 3 and 5)) are listed in paragraph 12 (a) to (i) of the report (A/72/772). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the proposed restructuring would not change the priorities of the programmes of work of the Secretariat entities involved. **The Committee notes that the proposed transfer of some posts may have a potential impact on indicators of achievements or outputs and expects that information in that regard will be provided to the General Assembly at the time of its consideration of the present report.**

36. With respect to the impact of the merger into the proposed single regional structure, the Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that it is proposed that the wording "single political-operational regional structure under the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Department of Peace Operations" replace the wording "regional divisions" under programmes 2 and 4 of the biennial programme plan for 2018–2019 and under sections 3 and 5 of the programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019, and the wording "Office of Operations" under programme 4 of the biennial programme plan for 2018–2019 and section 5 of the programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019. As for the funding under the programme budget, the current resources for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations would continue to appear under section 5 of the proposed Department of Peace Operations, while the resources allocated to the regional divisions would continue to appear under section 3 for the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. However, the Committee was further informed that the restructuring would not give rise to any changes in the strategic framework, such as approved objectives, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievements or outputs related to programme 2, Political affairs and section 3, Political affairs, and programme 4, Peacekeeping operations and section 5, Peacekeeping operations.

Support account for peacekeeping operations

37. The Secretary-General further indicates that his proposals also relate to the results-based-budgeting framework set out in his report on the budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019 (A/72/790). A summary of the proposed post changes under the support account for peacekeeping operations for the 2018/19 financial period is provided in paragraph 123 (b) (i) to (vi) of the report of the Secretary-General (A/72/772). The proposed budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations for 2018/19 (A/72/790) is based on the proposal contained in the report (A/72/772). The report of the Advisory Committee on the proposed budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations is contained in document A/72/857.

38. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that, with respect to the actions required of the General Assembly as contained in paragraph 127 (c) of the report of the Secretary-General (A/72/772), the proposed actions include approval of the proposed resources, including the strengthening of the Peacebuilding Support Office, in the context of the proposed budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations for the 2018/19 period. This refers to the three posts (2 P-4 and 1 P-2) proposed for redeployment from the current Department of Peacekeeping Operations to the Peacebuilding Support Office under the support account. The approval of paragraph 127 (c) is considered approval of the proposed transfer of the three posts as reflected in the proposed budget for the support account budget for the 2018/19 period (see also para. 27 (b) above; see para. 32 above for the recommendations of the Committee).

Efficiency and effectiveness

39. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that, from the outset, the Secretary-General has stressed that his reforms are not a cost-cutting exercise, but are aimed at making the pillar more effective. **The Committee notes that it is not clear how enhanced effectiveness, one of the four objectives of the reform (see para. 2 above), could be measured, as no changes are envisaged in the approved expected accomplishments, indicators of achievements or outputs related to the respective programmes (see para. 35 above).**

40. The Advisory Committee also enquired as to whether a comprehensive staffing review had been undertaken for the proposed restructuring, in particular with regard to the single regional structure. The Committee was informed that a review had been undertaken to assess the roles and responsibilities of all the posts in the regional divisions of the Department of Political Affairs and the Office of Operations of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In the view of the Secretariat, the merger into a single structure would not change the current workload and it is expected that the workload would increase given the growing scope and complexity of the peace and security responsibilities of the Organization, including the increasing diplomatic and representational responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the heads of departments in support of the Secretary-General, and the level of engagement with Member States. As for why some divisions would have one D-2 and more than one D-1, the Committee was informed that the number of D-1 Principal Officers would range from one to three in a division, depending on the workload.

41. **The Advisory Committee notes that, of the 849 existing posts currently approved for the two departments[7] (excluding those of the Peacebuilding Support Office), the proposed restructuring yields limited efficiencies, in particular with regard to the merger into a single regional structure and an Office of the Director for Coordination and Shared Services serving the two new departments. The Committee would have expected that a major organizational initiative of this magnitude, involving two large existing departments, would have led to economies of scale and resources freed up by eliminating duplication of efforts. The Committee is therefore of the view that, rather than co-location of offices, the proposed single regional structure and executive offices should lead to more efficiencies and efforts should continue to identify efficiencies, including post reductions.**

42. In this connection, the Advisory Committee notes that, in the proposed Executive Office of the Office of the Director for Coordination and Shared Services

[7] The Department of Political Affairs has 263 posts funded under the regular budget and 51 under the extrabudgetary resources, while the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has 27 posts under the regular budget, 446 under the support account and 62 under extrabudgetary resources.

(A/72/7/772, annex IV), there are a total of 21 General Service-level posts and positions funded under the regular budget, the support account and extrabudgetary resources. **Taking into account the potential efficiencies to be achieved within the proposed single Executive Office of the two new departments, the Committee recommends the abolishment of two posts (General Service (Other level)) under the regular budget for the biennium 2018–2019. Related non-post resources should be adjusted accordingly.**

V. Link to other reforms proposed by the Secretary-General

43. The Secretary-General indicates that his management reforms are as crucial as his reforms to the peace and security architecture to improving the ability of the Organization to respond to challenges to international peace and security (see A/72/772, para. 118). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that, while the objectives are similar, the two reforms cover different aspects of the Secretariat's functioning and that the proposals are not interlinked and will proceed separately. Should one be approved and not the other, it is entirely possible to conceive of a functional solution whereby one side (management or peace and security) is unchanged and not the other.

44. The Advisory Committee was further informed, upon enquiry, that, while the Department of Peacekeeping is covered under the peace and security reforms and the Department of Field Support is covered under the management reforms, there are a few exceptions. These include: (a) the proposed embedding of six support officers in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Peace Operations, budgeted currently under the Department of Field Support and proposed to be under the Department of Operational Support (see paras. 46 and 47 below); (b) the transfer of the Senior Leadership Appointment Section from the Office of the Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Field Support to the Office of the Director for Coordination and Shared Services (see paras. 4 (d) and 7 (b) above); and (c) the transfer, to the Department of Operational Support, of a number of posts (i) from the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support (Executive Office and Focal Point for Security), and (ii) from the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to be embedded in the Integrated Training Service and Peace Operations Policy and Best Practices Service. **As indicated in paragraph 9 above, the recommendations of the Committee on the proposed management reform and the global service delivery model will be contained in its forthcoming reports.**

45. The Secretary-General further indicates that coordination between the management and support structure and the peace and security pillar would be part of the normal course of work of the departments, but would also be further facilitated through mechanisms at various levels to ensure the successful establishment, functioning and transitioning of peace and security field presences. At the strategic level, this would be achieved through the representation of the peace and security pillar on a Management Client Board, the internal governance mechanism for the proposed new management structure. At the operational level, a pool of six specialized officers from the Department of Operational Support would be embedded in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations (see A/72/772, para. 119).

46. Concerning the six (3 P-5 and 3 P-4) of the current seven officers of the Department of Field Support supporting the integrated operational teams in the existing Office of Operations, it is indicated in paragraph 48 of the report that they

would be relocated to the Office of the Under-Secretary-General of the proposed Department of Peace Operations (to be budgeted under the proposed Department of Operational Support). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that, as part of the restructuring of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the establishment of the Department of Field Support in 2007, Department of Field Support mission support officers from the Office of the Assistant Secretary-General were embedded in the then newly established integrated operational teams along with specialized political, military, police and rule of law capabilities, to facilitate an integrated approach to the Headquarters backstopping of peacekeeping missions. Of the seven integrated operational team posts currently approved,[8] it is proposed, under the management reform, to (a) reassign one post of senior administrative officer (P-5) to the new Support Partnerships Service in the Department of Operational Support as a senior programme officer; and (b) transfer the other six officers to the Office of the Director for Special Activities in the Department of Operational Support, with two posts of senior administrative officer (P-5) proposed to be downgraded to administrative officer (P-4). In addition, two practical changes to their functions are proposed: first, the officers, who currently perform functions as generalists in mission support, would be required to perform as specialists in the areas of supply chain management, human resources, budget and finance and information and communications technology; and second, the officers, who are currently embedded in integrated operational teams, would become a pooled resource located in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, to be drawn upon as required to support the requirements of the different integrated operational teams within the regional structure.

47. **The Advisory Committee notes that information with respect to the current and proposed functions of the six posts is not clearly presented, in particular concerning how the proposed arrangement would work in practical terms and why their location in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General is deemed preferable to the current arrangements, by which they are with the integrated operational teams within the Office of Operations. Furthermore, the Committee notes that their proposed specialized functions, in the areas of supply chain management, human resources, budget and finance and information and communications technology, would be available in the proposed Office of the Director for Coordination and Shared Services (see para. 4 (d) above). The Committee expects that detailed information and clarification should therefore be provided to the General Assembly at the time of its consideration of the present report.**

48. With respect to the functions of the proposed new joint executive office within the Office of the Director for Coordination and Shared Services, it is indicated that, in his report to the General Assembly entitled "Shifting the management paradigm in the United Nations: ensuring a better future for all" (A/72/492), the Secretary-General has proposed that executive offices assume the role of "business partner". The envisaged functions are described in paragraph 113 of the report of the Secretary-General (A/72/772). **While the Advisory Committee has no objection to the proposed establishment of the Office of the Director for Coordination and Shared Services for the two new departments, this should not be considered as an endorsement of the proposed "business partner" concept, which will be considered separately in the forthcoming reports of the Committee on the**

[8] One Senior Logistics Officer (P-5, for the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur-United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei) and six Senior Administrative Officers (5 P-5 and 1 P-4, for UNMISS, West Africa, Central Africa, Europe, Latin America and Asia, Middle East and North Africa and the Great Lakes)

management reform and global service delivery model proposed by the Secretary-General.

49. **In addition, the Advisory Committee is of the view that the coordination functions to be undertaken by the Director for Coordination and Shared Services, serving the two new departments and the single regional structure, with functions significantly different from those of the existing Chief of Staff of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support, should be kept under review if approved by the General Assembly.**

VI. Conclusion

50. The actions requested of the General Assembly are set out in paragraph 127 (a) to (c) of the report of the Secretary-General (A/72/772). **The recommendations of the Advisory Committee in paragraphs 31 and 42 above would entail a reduction of $268,000 to the revised estimates relating to the programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019 (see also paras. 32, 37 and 38 above. Subject to its comments and recommendations above, the Committee has no objection to the revised estimates relating to the programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019 and the related part of the proposed budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations for 2018/19.**

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Security Council
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Letter dated 30 April 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 27 April 2018, addressed to you by Mehmet Dânâ, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Feridun H. **Sinirlioğlu**
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 30 April 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

27 April 2018

Upon instructions from my Government, I am writing in response to the letter dated 2 April 2018 addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative in New York and circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council (A/72/819–S/2018/289), which yet again contains false assertions similar to those made in his previous letters. In order to set the record straight, I would like to bring the following to your kind attention.

At the outset, regarding the claims of so-called "infringements of international air traffic regulations" and "violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey", I wish, once again, to reiterate that flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and consent of the relevant authorities of the State, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or right of say whatsoever. The civil aviation authority of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the sole competent authority to provide air traffic and aeronautical information services within its own national airspace. As for the false assertion that notices to airmen are "illegally issued", it must be underlined that activities within the Ercan advisory airspace that require notices to airmen are carried out by the relevant authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in accordance with article 3 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention).

Similarly, the claim in the letter regarding the Turkish Cypriot ports is also baseless, given the fact that the Greek Cypriot administration has no jurisdiction or right of say over Northern Cyprus. Furthermore, this claim ignores the present realities on the ground, namely, the existence of two independent self-governing States on the island of Cyprus, each exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction within its respective territory.

As to the repeated false allegations regarding Ercan Airport in the North, it should once again be underlined that the technologically up-to-date Ercan area control centre and airport in North Cyprus have been providing regular, reliable and safe air traffic services since the Greek Cypriot refusal in 1977 to provide air traffic services in the northern part of the island, in line with its isolation policy that has been imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people. Ever since, all flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus have taken place with the full knowledge and permission of the Civil Aviation Department of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or control. Furthermore, I would like to stress that the allegation regarding the interference of radio frequencies is also totally baseless.

Moreover, the isolation imposed on the Turkish Cypriots, which the Greek Cypriot side attempts to perpetuate by encouraging the international community to deem all airports and seaports in Northern Cyprus "illegal", is in complete contravention of international law, as well as the call made by the then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in his report to the Security Council dated 28 May 2004 (S/2004/437), in which he clearly stated: "I would hope they [members of the Security Council] can give a strong lead to all States to cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development, deeming such a move as consistent with Security Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984)."

The legislation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on aeronautical safety meets all standards and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization, providing safe and swift navigation of aircraft landing at or taking off from Ercan Airport and using airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. All airports in Northern Cyprus are in full conformity with international standards, and necessary investments have been made to keep up with the developing technology. The number of air traffic controllers has been increased in accordance with the increasing number of flights over the years, and the Ercan area control centre is in regular and close cooperation with the Ankara area control centre in order to ensure the safe conduct of all flights in the region. In 2017 alone, the number of passengers who used Ercan Airport stood at 3,962,541, and this number is expected to be 4,200,294 in 2018. Moreover, in 2017, 27,197 aeroplanes used Ercan Airport for arrival and departure and 189,787 aeroplanes used the Ercan advisory airspace, and these numbers are expected to reach 27,469 and 193,583, respectively, in 2018. In that regard, it must also be stressed that the Turkish Cypriot side is committed to upholding the highest standards in the field of air navigation safety, in full conformity with the Chicago Convention of 1944, and that it is ready to cooperate with the Greek Cypriot authorities on this very important issue.

Availing myself of the present opportunity, I would like to call upon the Greek Cypriot side to discontinue such counterproductive and outdated rhetoric. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot administration should once again be reminded that its counterpart is, and has always been, the Turkish Cypriot side, not Turkey.

(*Signed*) Mehmet **Dânâ**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

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Security Council
Seventy-third year

Culture of peace

Prevention of armed conflict

Measures to eliminate international terrorism

The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy

Letter dated 30 April 2018 from the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

China is the current Chair of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the statement by the Heads of States members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on joint action to counter international terrorism (see annex), which was issued at the seventeenth meeting of the Council of Heads of States members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, held in Astana on 9 June 2017.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 15, 34, 109 and 118, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Ma** Zhaoxu
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-07620 (E) 140518 150518

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Annex to the letter dated 30 April 2018 from the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General*

[Original: Chinese and Russian]

Statement by the Heads of State of the States members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on joint action to counter international terrorism

We, the Heads of State of the States members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, note with great concern that international terrorism continues to present a growing global threat to States' peace, security and sovereignty.

We resolutely condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, and emphasize that efforts to counter international terrorism, and cooperation in counter-terrorism, must be conducted in strict compliance with the goals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the universally accepted norms of international law, with the United Nations and the United Nations Security Council in a central coordinating role.

We call on all States to implement in their entirety the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, and the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

We wish to emphasize once again that, in working to achieve effective action against international terrorism on the basis of the rule of law, we consider violations of the principles of State sovereignty, equality of rights and territorial integrity, and non-interference in States' internal affairs, to be inadmissible, and that the use of terrorist and extremist groups to further political and geopolitical objectives is absolutely unacceptable.

We note the increasing threats to global security caused by growing activity on the part of terrorist organizations, a situation which will increase tension in the area covered by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

We reaffirm our common commitment to countering the variety of organizations and groups recognized as terrorist or extremist in nature in the territories of any of the States members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

We acknowledge the importance of further strengthening international cooperation in countering terrorism, and call on the international community to unite in a broad counter-terrorism coalition to combat global terrorism, which is causing destabilization and increasing tension in individual States and entire regions, including the area covered by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

We support the holding of international high-level meetings on Syria within the Astana process as a vital adjunct to the intra-Syrian talks in Geneva, and encourage broad participation on the part of the international community. We hope that the agreements reached in the framework of the Astana process will lend positive impetus to the political settlement of the Syrian crisis under the auspices of the United Nations as part of the Geneva process in accordance with Security Council resolution 2254 (2015).

We emphasize the need for collective action to counter the spread of terrorist and extremist ideology, including action to prevent and block terrorist and extremist

* The annex is being circulated in Chinese, English and Russian only.

propaganda, incitement to terrorism and extremism, and recruitment, by the Internet and other means. It is also important to agree action to be applied to individuals returning to the territories of the States members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization after taking part in the actions of international terrorist organizations as foreign terrorist fighters.

We regard as inadmissible any public justification of terrorism aimed at incitement to commit or commission of terrorist acts, including justification taking the form of statements by politicians or officials, and we call for closer international cooperation in that connection. We support the proposal of the Russian Federation for a draft Security Council resolution on countering the spread of terrorist ideology, to build on the provisions of the pertinent Security Council resolution 1624 (2005).

We declare that terrorist attacks committed by individuals or groups associating themselves with a particular religion or convictions must never serve as the pretext for intolerance towards persons on grounds of their religious affiliation.

We believe it wholly unacceptable to associate terrorism with any religion, and resolutely condemn all manifestations of intolerance, discrimination or violence with regard to Christians, Muslims or representatives of other faiths.

Recognising that States and their competent authorities play the determining role in countering terrorism and extremism, and in any international cooperation in that regard, we believe that to repel terrorist and extremist threats effectively, and to strengthen civil immunity to radical ideas, State efforts must be supplemented by the potential of public structures, the media, religious communities, and educational and research institutions in the States members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

We are convinced that terrorism cannot be countered effectively unless the sources of its funding are definitively cut off, as required by the pertinent resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, and by the international standards of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

With regard to the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions 2199 (2015) and 2253 (2015), we advocate rapidly launching efforts to identify natural and legal persons engaged in economic relations with terrorist organizations, in order to put an end to their criminal activities.

We believe that the maintenance of stability in the States members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization will be furthered by continuing to develop cooperation within the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Organization and the expansion of practical counter-terrorism collaboration between States at political level, in intelligence services and the pertinent ministries and departments.

We confirm our shared resolve to promote other multilateral and bilateral interaction in the interests of countering international terrorism effectively.

Astana, 9 June 2017

United Nations A/72/862–S/2018/446

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
11 May 2018

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 34
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 9 May 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instructions of my Government, I am transmitting herewith the record of the ceasefire violations by the Azerbaijani armed forces along the State border of the Republic of Armenia during the month of April 2018 (see annex I).*

I am also transmitting herewith the record of the ceasefire violations registered by the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh Republic) during the month of April 2018 (see annex II).*

I kindly request that the present letter and its annexes be circulated as a document of the seventy-second session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Zohrab **Mnatsakanyan**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only.

18-07644 (E) 150518

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Annex I to the letter dated 9 May 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan along the State border with the Republic of Armenia, 1–30 April 2018

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
1 April	There were no shots		
2 April	**Tavush region**	**4**	Small arms and light weapons: 85
	Kolagir	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 46
	Aygedzor	1	
	Aygepar	1	
	Kayan	1	
3 April	**Tavush and Ararat regions**	**4**	Small arms and light weapons: 5
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2
	Aygepar	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 6 (Aygedzor)
	Dovegh	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
4 April	**Tavush region**	**14**	Small arms and light weapons: 109
	Aygedzor	6	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 3
	Chinari	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 3
	Vazashen	3	
	Voskepar	1	
	Berkaber	1	
	Baghanis	1	
5 April	**Tavush region**	**2**	Small arms and light weapons: 22
	Chinari	1	
	Kayan	1	
6 April	**Tavush and Gegharkunik regions**	**12**	Small arms and light weapons: 193
	Aygedzor	4	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 8
	Chinari	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 70
	Movses	3	
	Kayan	1	
	Voskepar	1	
	Kutakan	1	
	Tiujur	1	
7 April	**Tavush and Gegharkunik regions**	**7**	Small arms and light weapons: 76
	Aygedzor	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3
	Aygepar	1	
	Kayan	1	
	Berkaber	1	
	Jil	1	
	Vahan	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapon/shots*
8 April	**Tavush, Gegharkunik and Ararat regions**	**22**	Small arms and light weapons: 146
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 11
	Paravakar	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 21 (Paruyr Sevak)
	Vazashen	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 16
	Voskepar	1	
	Geghamasar	1	
	Paruyr Sevak	16	
9 April	**Tavush, Gegharkunik and Ararat regions**	**28**	Small arms and light weapons: 658
	Aygedzor	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 14
	Chinari	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 20 (Aygedzor: 13; Paruyr Sevak: 7)
	Baghanis	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 15
	Voskepar	1	
	Geghamasar	1	
	Artanish	1	
	Paruyr Sevak	21	
10 April	**Tavush, Gegharkunik and Ararat regions**	**13**	Small arms and light weapons: 61
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4
	Paravakar	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 37 (Geghamasar: 30; Paruyr Sevak: 7)
	Berkaber	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 3
	Jil	1	
	Geghamasar	3	
	Paruyr Sevak	6	
11 April	**Tavush and Ararat regions**	**20**	
	Aygedzor	3	Small arms and light weapons: 469
	Chinari	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 89 (Aygedzor: 5; Berkaber: 1; Paruyr Sevak: 83)
	Berkaber	1	
	Baghanis	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 20
	Paruyr Sevak	22	
12 April	**Tavush and Ararat regions**	**16**	Small arms and light weapons: 587
	Baghanis	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2
	Berkaber	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 211 (Paruyr Sevak)
	Paruyr Sevak	14	Large-calibre machine guns: 350
13 April	**Tavush, Gegharkunik and Ararat regions**	**20**	Small arms and light weapons: 236
	Aygedzor	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 37 (Paruyr Sevak)
	Paravakar	5	Grenade launchers: 4
	Baghanis	2	Small-calibre mortars: 1 (Vahan)
	Jil	3	
	Vahan	1	
	Paruyr Sevak	8	
14 April	**Tavush, Gegharkunik and Ararat regions**	**9**	Small arms and light weapons: 60
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 14
	Aygepar	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 42 (Paruyr Sevak)
	Movses	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
	Chambarak	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 28
	Paruyr Sevak	5	
15 April	**Tavush and Ararat regions**	**10**	Small arms and light weapons: 68
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 10
	Berkaber	3	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 29 (Paruyr Sevak)
	Paruyr Sevak	6	Large-calibre machine guns: 37
16 April	**Tavush and Ararat regions**	**20**	Small arms and light weapons: 197
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 14
	Berkaber	4	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 5 (Paruyr Sevak)
	Kayan	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 112
	Sev Kar	1	
	Baghanis	6	
	Paruyr Sevak	7	
17 April	**Tavush and Ararat regions**	**15**	Small arms and light weapons: 43
	Chinari	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
	Movses	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Paruyr Sevak)
	Paruyr Sevak	12	Large-calibre machine guns: 68
18 April	**Tavush, Gegharkunik and Ararat regions**	**10**	Small arms and light weapons: 219
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 30
	Movses	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 38 (Paruyr Sevak)
	Barekamavan	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 159
	Vahan	1	
	Ttujur	1	
	Paruyr Sevak	5	
19 April	**Tavush and Ararat regions**	**15**	Small arms and light weapons: 102
	Aygedzor	8	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1
	Yeraskh	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 7 (Aygedzor)
	Paruyr Sevak	6	Large-calibre machine guns: 35
20 April	**Tavush and Ararat regions**	**8**	Small arms and light weapons: 152
	Aygedzor	3	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1
	Chinari	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 18 (Aygedzor: 3; Chinari: 15)
	Paravakar	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 7
	Movses	1	
	Barekamavan	1	
	Paruyr Sevak	1	
21 April	**Tavush and Ararat regions**	**5**	Small arms and light weapons: 80
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15
	Aygedzor	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 15 (Aygedzor)
	Berkaber	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 76
	Paruyr Sevak	2	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
22 April	**Tavush and Ararat regions**	**9**	Small arms and light weapons: 106
	Aygedzor	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Movses)
	Movses	1	
	Paravakar	1	
	Vazashen	2	
	Kayan	1	
	Yeraskh	3	
23 April	**Vayots Dzor and Ararat regions**	**4**	Small arms and light weapons: 13
	Khndzorut	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 4
	Paruyr Sevak	3	Large-calibre machine guns: 9
24 April	**Tavush, Syunik, Gegharkunik and Ararat regions**	**13**	Small arms and light weapons: 142 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2
	Chinari	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Chambarak)
	Vazashen	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 4
	Berdavan	1	
	Baghanis	1	
	Chapni	1	
	Chambarak	3	
	Vahan	1	
	Paruyr Sevak	2	
	Armash	1	
25 April	**Tavush region**	**5**	Small arms and light weapons: 17
	Aygedzor	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 6
	Movses	1	
	Kayan	1	
	Voskevan	1	
26 April	**There were no shots**		
27 April	**Tavush and Gegharkunik regions**	**20**	Small arms and light weapons: 305
	Aygedzor	4	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 40
	Aygepar	5	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 36 (Ttujur: 20, Vahan: 6, Chambarak: 10)
	Kolagir	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 50
	N. Karmiraghbyur	1	
	Kayan	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Ttujur	1	
	Vahan	2	
	Chambarak	3	
28 April	**Gegharkunik region**	**1**	Small arms and light weapons: 5
	Geghamasar	1	
29 April	**Tavush region**	**2**	Small arms and light weapons: 16
	Chinari	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 5
	Kirants	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
30 April	**Tavush region**	**4**	**Small arms and light weapons: 8**
	Chinari	1	**Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5**
	Movses	1	
	N. Karmiraghbyur	1	
	Barekamavan	1	

During the reporting period, one soldier of the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia was wounded by gunfire from the Azerbaijani side.

Annex II to the letter dated 9 May 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the line of contact with the Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh Republic), 1–30 April

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons shots*
1 April	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	29	Small arms and light weapons: 302 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 18 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Shikhlyar)
2 April	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	32	Small arms and light weapons: 326 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 12 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 4 (Shikhlyar)
3 April	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	33	Small arms and light weapons: 476 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 14 (Jraberd: 1; Gjulistan: 13)
4 April	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	44	Small arms and light weapons: 373 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 46 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 12 (Karakhanbeyli: 2; Geytap: 10) Large-calibre machine guns: 42
5 April	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	38	Small arms and light weapons: 567 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 13 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 4 (Gjulistan 4)
6 April	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	24	Small arms and light weapons: 325 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 19 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Yarmja)
7 April	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	15	Small arms and light weapons: 192 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 28 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 5 (Gjulistan)
8 April	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	35	Small arms and light weapons: 381 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 3 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 11 (Nuzger) Large-calibre machine guns: 8
9 April	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	22	Small arms and light weapons: 374 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 9 (Horadiz: 2; Kengerli: 7)
10 April	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	31	Small arms and light weapons: 234 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 13 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 11 (Karakhanbeyli: 1; Talish: 10)

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons shots*
11 April	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	25	Small arms and light weapons: 291 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 22 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 15 (Karakhanbeyli)
12 April	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	35	Small arms and light weapons: 487 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 19 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 7 (Chakhrli: 1; Taghibeyli: 1; Sarijanli: 2; Shurabad: 1; Levonarkh: 2)
13 April	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	46	Small arms and light weapons: 532 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 38 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 10 (Karachuk: 5; Gjulistan: 5) Large-calibre machine guns: 40 Grenade launchers: 3
14 April	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	25	Small arms and light weapons: 273 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 19 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 5 (Ashaghi Abdurakhmanli)
15 April	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	23	Small arms and light weapons: 146 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 18 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 5 (Kurapatkino)
16 April	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	24	Small arms and light weapons: 266 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 7
17 April	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	34	Small arms and light weapons: 478 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 36 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Ashaghi Abdurakhmanli)
18 April	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	19	Small arms and light weapons: 207 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2 Grenade launchers: 3
19 April	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	35	Small arms and light weapons: 308 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 24
20 April	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	39	Small arms and light weapons: 457 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 22 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Kengerli) Large-calibre machine guns: 12
21 April	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	28	Small arms and light weapons: 245 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 10 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Kurapatkino)
22 April	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	16	Small arms and light weapons: 334 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 18

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
23 April	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	27	Small arms and light weapons: 232 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Ashaghi Veysali) Large-calibre machine guns: 12
24 April	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	28	Small arms and light weapons: 214 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Ashaghi Abdurakhmanli)
25 April	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	31	Small arms and light weapons: 319 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 12 Large-calibre machine guns: 3
26 April	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	40	Small arms and light weapons: 439 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 7 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 12 (Gyulistan) Large-calibre machine guns: 14
27 April	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	22	Small arms and light weapons: 236 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 7 (Kengerli: 6, Jraberd: 1)
28 April	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	18	Small arms and light weapons: 168 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 9 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Levonarkh)
29 April	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	19	Small arms and light weapons: 274 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 7 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 13 (Kenderli: 3; Jraberd: 10)
30 April	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	22	Small arms and light weapons: 274 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 10 (Korgan) Large-calibre machine guns: 6

During the reporting period, one soldier of the Defence Army of Artsakh was killed and two soldiers were wounded by gunfire from the Azerbaijani side.

United Nations

A/72/863

General Assembly

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11 May 2018

Original: English

Seventy-second session
Agenda item 118
The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy

Letter dated 10 May 2018 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the President of the General Assembly

I have the honour to bring to your attention the joint report of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism and the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (S/2018/435), prepared pursuant to paragraph 18 of Security Council resolution 2395 (2017).

Following consideration of the report at the 330th meeting of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism, the Committee agreed to recommend that the document be issued as a document of the Council and that the President of the Council address a letter to the President of the General Assembly, bringing the report to the attention of the Assembly in the context of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy review.

(*Sincerely*) Joanna **Wronecka**
President of the Security Council

18-07703 (E) 150518

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United Nations A/72/864

General Assembly

Distr.: General
17 May 2018

Original: English

Seventy-second session
Agenda item 109
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Letter dated 7 May 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Tajikistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to bring to your attention the declaration of the high-level international conference on countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism, held in Dushanbe on 3 and 4 May 2018.*

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 109.

(*Signed*) Jonibek **Hikmatov**
Chargé d'affaires

* Available from http://mfa.tj/?l=en&cat=8&art=3341.

18-07959 (E) 210518

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